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ABSTRACT
Especially since the start of the second decade of the twenty-first century, once more we have
seen more focused interest in the use of SWFs by home states—less as a means of projecting
sovereign financial power outwards and more as a means of internal financial management, and
development. What makes this interesting from the perspective of SWF development is the role of
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in SWF development. This article takes a first look at the
way in which IFIs have also begun to use SWFs in their interactions, with a emphasis on
developing states. A review of some recent efforts to establish SWFs with a stabilization or
development focus suggests the way in which these funds now may better serve the project of
fiscal and governance internationalization, and the development of global policy coherence around
the fiscal ideologies of IFIs, rather than as an instrument of national policy. Part II briefly sketches
the IFI’s interest in and approach to SWFs as a part of their investment, capacity building and rule
of law toolkits. Part III then reviews the manifestation of this approach in the development of
SWFs in a number of developing states. The article suggests ways in which stabilization and
development SWFs may better serve financial globalization than the particular interest of states
establishing them precisely by transposing global standards of fiscal and governance behavior into
the internal workings of states. In this sense, development and stabilization SWFs serve as an
instrument of globalization from the top down (through IFI policy operationalization) perhaps as
effectively as SWFs that seek to project national financial power through private market
investments abroad. But it also creates the possibility of divergence in SWF character as the
consequences of the use of SWFs as governance devices may produce substantial deviation from
the traditional organizational parameters of SWFs as instruments of macroeconomic policy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) have emerged, especially from the start of the twenty-first century,
as important players in global finance.1 They represent a marked departure from the traditional
roles of states and permit political entities, public institutions, to engage in private market
transactions beyond their national borders as private market participants. They underline an
important element in the development of institutions and systems beyond the state.2 They also
implicate a number of factors in the role of states as structures for the management of economic
policy, and as a participant in those markets.3
SWFs incarnate and replicate the collisions between two tectonic forces that are grinding
their way to a new normative framework of governance and power. On the one side is the
state system, grounded in principles of sovereignty and of the fundamental distinction
between the state and everything else, founded on formal structures and the respect for
territorial borders. On the other side is the emerging system of societally constituted
functionally distinct governance organs, grounded in principles of free movement of capital
and investment, founded on systems of functional structures in which territory boundaries
reference the functional boundaries of self constituted groups.4
Though SWFs attract less attention in the popular press than they did before the events of the Arab
Spring and related events distracted the media and political elites, they remain an important and
increasingly significant actor in the evolution of economic globalization and its consequences for the
role of states and non-state enterprises in economic markets.5 SWFs have become an integral part of
interlocked and network economic relations that in the aggregate give globalization its form.6
Developed states continue to encourage inbound investment by SWFs,7 though constrained by their
national interests,8 and sometimes fearful of the political effects of the exportation of financial power.9
In recent years, SWFs have evolved significantly as investors.10 SWFs are not an inconsiderable
source of foreign direct investment and are investing in a broad spectrum of assets including
farmland, airports, energy, finance, real estate, equity markets and have strengthened global
economic links by entering into partnerships and joint ventures with private entities and other SWFs.
1See, e.g., Joel Slawotsky, Sovereign Wealth Funds as Emerging Financial Superpowers: How U.S. Regulators
Should Respond, 40 GEO. J. INT‘L L. 1239, 1239, 1246–48 (2009).
2See Larry Catá Backer, The Structural Characteristics of Global Law for the 21st Century: Fracture, Fluidity,
Permeability, and Polycentricity, 17(2) TILBURG L. REV. 177 (2012).
3Udaibir S. Das, Yinqiu Lu, Christian Mulder & Amadou Sy, Setting up a Sovereign Wealth Fund: Some Policy and
Operational Considerations 5 (International Monetary Fund, Working Paper WP/09/179, 2009) available at https://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09179.pdf (“Created by the general government for macroeconomic
purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or administer financial assets to achieve financial objectives, and employ a set of
investment strategies which include investing in foreign financial assets.”).
4Larry Catá, Review Essay: Taking a Step Toward a Law for Sovereign Wealth Funds (Consortium for Peace Ethics
Working Paper No. 2012-9/1, 2012) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼2143452.
5See, e.g., Nigeria To Start $1B Sovereign Wealth Fund, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 28, 2012, 1:18 PM), http://bigstory.ap.
org/article/nigeria-start-1b-sovereign-wealth-fund (“Nigerian authorities pushed for the creation of a sovereign wealth
fund as a means to better save the billions of dollars the nation annually earns from oil revenues. Opaque budgeting
and corruption sees much of the money siphoned away.”).
6Cf. JOSEPH STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK (W. W. Norton & Company 2007); MARWAN M. KRAISDY, HYBRIDITY OR THE
CULTURAL LOGIC OF GLOBALIZATION (2005).
7Rebecca Blumenstein & Laura Meckler, Chinese Firms Set Sights on U.S. Investments, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Jan. 27,
2011, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704062604576105952027426880 (“At the meeting, President
Barack Obama and the head of China’s Investment Corp., the country’s $300 billion sovereign-wealth fund, talked
about the Chinese investing in infrastructure projects in the US “The United States is open for investment and would
welcome it,” Mr. Obama told the group, which included four Chinese CEOs, 14 American CEOs and Chinese President
Hu Jintao.”).
8In the United States, this interest review is undertaken by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States (CFIUS), an inter-agency committee authorized to review “covered transactions” (transactions that could result
in control of a US business by a foreign person), in order to determine the effect of such transactions on the national
security of the United States. This system of review is undertaken pursuant to Defense Production Act of 1950, as
amended by the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (section 721) and as implemented by
Executive Order 11858, as amended, and regulations at 31 C.F.R. Part 800. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, THE COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) (2012), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/Pages/
Committee-on-Foreign-Investment-in-US.aspx. The political effects can be significant. See, e.g., Ziad Haider, China Inc.
and the CFIUS National Security Review, THE DIPLOMAT, Dec. 5, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/china-inc-and-the-
cfius-national-security-review/.
9See, e.g., Edwin Truman, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: THREAT OR SALVATION? (2010).
10See, e.g., Massimiliano Castelli & Fabio Scacciavillani, THE NEW ECONOMICS OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS (2012).
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It is no surprise, then, that SWFs have become objects of intense and systematic study.11 This
academic and policy engagement is generally divided among those with an interest in governance
structure, fund management, and investment objectives, strategy and implementation.12 Of particular
importance to lawyers and policy analysts are those issues touching on an exploration of emerging
governance issues of sovereign wealth funds.13 Of particular interest to economists have been the
effects of sovereign investing on extraterritorial markets.14
But SWFs are not merely of concern to host states,15 or to home states as a means of strategic
sovereign investing,16 or as a method of levering power in international governance.17 Especially
since the start of the second decade of the twenty-first century, once again we have seen more
focused interest in the use of SWFs by home states—less as a means of projecting sovereign
financial power outwards and more as a means of internal financial management,18 and
development.19 They have also been seen as vehicles for regional development.20 Indeed, SWFs
have been increasingly seen as important instruments of internal macroeconomic policy.21
They are both deeply embedded within and outside their home states.22
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have also begun to consider the value of SWFs in their
own activities. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was a facilitator in the development of the
institutional architecture23 that led to the development of the influential soft law standards of SWF
11See, e.g., Fabio Bassan, THE LAW OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS (2011); Gordon L. Clark, Adam D. Dixon & Ashby H.B.
Monk, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: LEGITIMACY, GOVERNANCE, AND GLOBAL POWER (2013).
12See, e.g., Abdullah Al-Hassan, Michael G. Papaioannou, Martin Skancke & Cheng Chih Sung, Sovereign Wealth
Funds: Aspects of Governance Structures and Investment Management (International Monetary Fund, Working Paper
No. WP/13/231, 2013), available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13231.pdf; Foreign Government
Investment in the U.S. Economy and Financial Sector, Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Domestic and Int’l Monetary
Pol’y, Trade, and Tech. and the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Gov’t Sponsored Enterprises of the
Comm. on Fin. Services, 110th Cong. 24–28 (2008) (statement of Martin Skancke, Director General, Asset
Management Department of the Ministry of Finance in Norway) available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
110hhrg41725/html/CHRG-110hhrg41725.htm.
13See, e.g., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS (Xu Yi-chong & Gawdat Bahgat eds., 2010); cf. Eliot Kalter
and Thomas F. Holt, Jr., Key International Issues for Sovereign Wealth Funds, THE FLETCHER SCHOOL SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND
INITIATIVE (2010), available at http://fletcher.tufts.edu/CEME/,/media/Fletcher/Microsites/CEME/newpdfs/SWFI_Key_
Issues.ashx; Gawdat Bahgat, Sovereign Wealth Funds, An Assessment, Global Policy, 1 GLOBAL POL’Y 162 (2010),
available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2010.00008.x/pdf. For an application in the context
of a subordinate governmental unit, see CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA, EXAMINING THE ISSUES OF
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 10–12 (2012) (suggesting that SWFs are on balance, not of benefit to developed states or their
subordinate units), available at http://www.cciwa.com/docs/advocacy/sovereign-wealth-paper_final.pdf?sfvrsn¼2.
14See, e g., Tao Sun & Heiko Hesse, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Financial Stability—An Event Study Analysis
(International Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/09/239, 2009), available at http://www10.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/
PE/2009/04299.pdf.
15See, e.g., Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - A common European approach to Sovereign Wealth
Funds, COM (2008) 0115 final (Feb. 27, 2008), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/;jsessionid
¼dq3pTLMJtQgJhfggjqYskf86r2WT9ppzGXhSwkJNHvVMQ7gkZp2v!-1639360510?uri¼CELEX:52008DC0115.
16Cf. Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crises: Global Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, State
Owned Enterprises, and the Chinese Experience, 19 TRANSNAT‘L & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (2010).
17Cf. Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Investing and Markets-Based Transnational Rule of Law Building: The Norwegian
Sovereign Wealth Fund in Global Markets, 29 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (2013).
18See, e.g., JOHN SHIELDS & MAURICIO VILLAFUERTE, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND ECONOMIC POLICY AT HOME, IN ECONOMICS OF
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: ISSUES FOR POLICYMAKERS (Udaibir Das et al., eds., 2010); see also, Håvard Halland, Alan Gelb &
Silvana Tordo, Sovereign Wealth Funds Investing at Home: Opportunity Fraught with Risks, available at Otaviano
Canuto, Sovereign Wealth Funds Are Coming Home, WORLD BANK INST. GROWTH & CRISIS BLOG (Jan. 15, 2014),
http://blogs.worldbank.org/growth/sovereign-wealth-funds-are-coming-home.
19See, e.g., ALAN GELB, SILVANA TORDO & HÅVARD HALLAND, THE WORLD BANK, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND DOMESTIC INVESTMENT IN
RESOURCE-RICH COUNTRIES: LOVE ME, OR LOVE ME NOT? (2014), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/
Resources/EP133.pdf.
20See, e.g., Asim Ali & Shatha Al-Aswad, SWFs and Egypt: A Fresh Look at Infrastructure Funding and Investments,
THE FLETCHER SCHOOL SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INITIATIVE (2012), available at http://fletcher.tufts.edu/SWFI-OLD/,/media/
Fletcher/Microsites/swfi/pdfs/2012/Asim-Shatha-SWFI-Egypt%20Final2.pdf.
21See Al-Hassan et al., supra note 12 (discussing, among other things, SWF roles in macroeconomic management
and the need for close coordination with other macroeconomic and financial policies as well as their role in global
financial stability).
22Cf. Michel Aglietta, Sovereign Wealth Funds in the Mutation of Global Finance, CSAF INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
(2013), available at http://economix.fr/pdf/seminaires/crise/ABUDHABI_MA_2013.pdf.
23That institutional architecture, the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, “met at IMF
Headquarters in Washington, D.C. The meeting facilitated a useful exchange of views among the SWFs, recipient
countries, and representatives from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the
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behavioral principles,24 the Santiago Principles.25 Especially in the form of stabilization and
savings funds,26 and development funds,27 and for fiscal disciplinary purposes,28 SWFs have been
taken up with the IMF’s technical assistance and lending projects for some time.29 It now appears
that IFIs may come to view SWFs as a useful part of the IFI’s lending and capacity building toolkits
for developing states that meet certain criteria. At the same time, SWFs have come to view IFIs,
like the World Bank, as a potential investment aggregator and conduit.30
This article takes a first look to the way in which IFIs have also begun to use SWFs in their
lending and technical assistance programs, with an emphasis on developing states. It focuses
specifically on the effects of IFI leadership in shaping SWF organization and operation as it might
relate, generally, to the broad governance themes of climate change, corporate governance of
portfolio companies, environmental protection, ethical investing, global financial regulation, human
rights, regulation of SWFs, renewable energy and sustainable development.31 The object is to
consider the way that SWFs serve important institutional objectives in addition to the macro
economic objectives traditionally at the heart of SWF function. Part II briefly sketches the IFI’s
interest in and approach to SWFs as a part of their investment, capacity building and rule of law
toolkits. Part III then reviews the manifestation of this approach in the development of SWFs in a
number of developing states. The central insight of this analysis, and the thesis of this article is
this: a functional examination of SWFs established in developing states (whether or not
Footnote continued
European Commission . . . . The IWG is comprised of representatives from 25 IMF member countries, and is co-chaired
by a senior representative of the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) and the Director of the IMF’s Monetary and
Capital Markets Department who were selected by the participating SWFs.” Press Release, International Working
Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds is Established to Facilitate
Work on Voluntary Principles (May 1, 2008) available at http://www.iwg-swf.org/pr/swfpr0801.htm.
24In 2008, the OECD Secretary General explained the nature of the facilitation and the involvement of IPO
and IFIs:
A year ago, the G7 called on the IMF and the OECD to explore how sovereign wealth fund investments
fit into the global economy. Following that call, in April of this year, the OECD Investment Committee
sent the message that recipient countries welcome investment from SWFs, and that they will treat such
investments the same as any other foreign investment. Today, the Sovereign Wealth Funds and the
IMF have delivered a set of Agreed Principles and Practices about their own transparency and
governance.
IMF Ministerial-level Roundtable on the “Santiago Principles” for Sovereign Wealth Funds, remarks by OECD Secretary-
General, OECD, Oct. 11, 2008, http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/imfministerial-levelroundtableonthesanti
agoprinciplesforsovereignwealthfundsremarksbyoecdsecretary-general.htm.
25INT’L WORKING GRP. OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES (GAPP) (2008) [hereinafter
SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES], available at http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf.
26“Stabilization funds aim to reduce the impact of volatile revenue on the government and the economy. Savings
funds seek to create a store of wealth for future generations.” Jeffrey Davis, Rolando Ossowski, James Daniel &
Steven Barnett, Stabilization and Savings Funds for Nonrenewable Resources Experience and Fiscal Policy
Implications, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 205 (2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
nft/op/205/.
27For a brief definition, see, e.g., Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND
(SDSWF), http://www.swfinstitute.org/statistics-research/strategic-development-sovereign-wealth-fund/
(last visited Sept. 30, 2014) (identifying a domestic stabilizer scenario, an industry job creator scenario, a country-
corporate alliance scenario, and a resource transfer scenario).
28“The general justification for such funds is that some share of government revenues derived from the
exploitation of a nonrenewable resource should be put aside for when these revenues decline, because the price of
the resource has fallen, or the resource has been depleted or both.” Id.
29The approach was described in IMF Intensifies Work on Sovereign Wealth Funds, IMF SURVEY MAGAZINE ONLINE
(Mar. 4, 2008), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2008/pol03408a.htm.
30See Howard Schneider, World Bank gets help from sovereign wealth funds to invest in developing
nations, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 18, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/17/
AR2010041702921.html.
31See, e.g., Eva van der Zee, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Socially Responsible Investing: Do’s and Dont’s, 9
EUROPEAN COMPANY L. 141 (2012); Benjamin J. Richardson, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Socially Responsible Investing:
An Emerging Public Fiduciary, 1:2 GLOBAL J. OF COMP. L. 125 (2013). The United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development sponsored a roundtable in October 2014 entitled “Sovereign Wealth Fund Round Table Promoting long-
term sustainable investment” as part of the UNCTD World Investment Forum, Palais des Nations, Geneva “policy
makers, executives of SWFs and public pension funds and investment experts examined opportunities and challenges
for mobilizing more investment by sovereign wealth and public pension funds in SDG sectors, and how governments
and sovereign and public investors can work together to facilitate these investments and magnify their contributions
to sustainable development.” Sovereign Wealth Fund Roundtable, WORLD INVESTMENT FORUM 2014 (Oct. 15, 2014, 14:30),
http://unctad-worldinvestmentforum.org/programme/sessions/promoting-long-term-sustainable-investment/.
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resource rich) suggests that the expansion of the use of SWFs, driven in part by IFIs,
may be creating a fundamental tension as the consequences of operating SWFs to enhance
governance reforms and serve as a tool of governance capacity building may begin to make
it more difficult to achieve, in substantial respects, the use of SWFs as instruments of
macroeconomic policy.
II. IFIS AND SWFS—FROM NATIONAL TO TRANSNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT IN THE
SERVICE OF A STABLE GLOBAL ORDER
One could understand the rationale for IMF involvement in the stabilization of the transnational
governance structures and principles of operations of SWFs in the first decade of the twenty-first
century. SWFs are large pools of savings, savings that can be used for a variety of investment
purposes, both within and outside the owning state. Thus, they are inherently a potentially
significant tool of economic policy, and of institutional discipline with respect to both internal
financial governance and external policy protective of the viability of domestic political economy
(however specifically or segmented these objectives may be understood in the context of these
funds). SWFs could be understood as an important element in the construction and viability of a
global system grounded on the free movement of capital and investment, one that the IMF was
perhaps at pains to protect. It is in that context that IFIs, like the World Bank and IMF, took
seriously any efforts by states to close their borders to capital inflows of any kind (outside of
a narrow national security related set of exceptions). To protect the private, commercialized
investment activities of states outside of their borders was to protect the central premises of the
emerging globalized economic (and especially financial) order. And, indeed, SWF home states did
their best to conform to at least a minimum level of “good conduct” expectations through the
development of behavior norms, and an organization of state actors to serve as an international
institutional mechanism for meeting objections to their behaviors.32 In that respect, it has been
substantially supported by a critical IFI, the IMF, in whose offices the International Forum of
Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF) Secretariat operated through 2014.33 SWFs also proved reliable
in making their funds available to the service of global finance.
SWFs, then, did not initially present themselves as having an inherent character that might lend
themselves to be used primarily as instruments of policy, beyond the broad stabilization and
pension obligation objectives of some funds.34 Indeed, the initial focus of SWFs was confined to
what was understood as the distinguishing characteristic of the SWF—the scope and character of
outbound investment.35 In these senses they did not necessarily touch those other core activities
of IFIs—lending to and support of developing states and their macroeconomic policies, especially
development.
32Thus, the IFSWF, was constituted as a “voluntary group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), which will meet,
exchange views on issues of common interest, and facilitate an understanding of the Santiago Principles and SWF
activities.” About, IFSWF, http://www.ifswf.org/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2014).
33See Press Release, International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, IFSWF Secretariat to relocate to the City of
London (Mar. 5, 2014) available at http://www.ifswf.org/pr/pr15.pdf (“The Secretariat currently operates from premises
at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washington, D.C. The decision to move to London, and establish a
permanent Secretariat, was taken by the Board and endorsed by IFSWF members in February 2014. The decision
further reinforces IFSWF’s position as a significant global institution.”).
34Though I have previously argued that even the commercial activities of these funds, especially that of Norway,
clearly evidenced a blending of private and public interests effectuated through private market investment. See, e.g.,
Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulatory Chameleons: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Funds and
Public Global Governance Through Private Global Investment, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 425 (2010).
35Indeed, consider in this light the definition of the SEF from the International Working Group of SWFs, the
organization responsible for the development of the Santiago Principles:
SWFs are defined as special purpose investment funds or arrangements, owned by the general
government. Created by the general government for macroeconomic purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or
administer assets to achieve financial objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies which
include investing in foreign financial assets. The SWFs are commonly established out of balance of
payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations, fiscal surpluses,
and/or receipts resulting from commodity exports.
SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 25, at Appendix I, 27. The Santiago Principles emphasize three critical elements of the
definition: ownership by a general government, investment strategies that include ownership of foreign financial
assets, and their establishment for macroeconomic purposes to achieve financial objectives. Id.
Page 5 of 26
Backer. International Review of Law 2015:swf.5
But this changed as the scope of SWF objectives both broadened and changed. By 2008,
influential actors were asking publicly and more often whether it was financially responsible for
the SWFs of developing states to invest abroad, especially in Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) state economies.36 The possibility of broadening SWF
objectives to include a role as sovereign development funds was considered. “Firstly, SWFs are, for
the most part, emerging market institutions . . . Secondly and even more interestingly, SWF have
not only become major development finance institutions in their own countries, but are also
becoming major players of development throughout the developing world.”37
SWFs investing domestically are not as unusual as one might expect . . . . But domestic
infrastructure investment remains uncharted territory for most SWFs. In light of the pressing
infrastructure needs, several resource-rich developing countries have established, or are in
the process of establishing, SWFs with an expanded role as a national investor. Angola,
Mongolia, Nigeria, and Papua New Guinea are among the most recent examples of
this apparent trend. Experts suggest that 20 SWFs are already mandated to invest
domestically . . . 38
This movement recently toward an embrace of inward focused SWFs, in the form of stabilization or
development funds, is neither necessarily a movement forward, nor has it arrived uncontested.
Some have argued that it ought to be remembered that stabilization funds in some senses
developed independently of what might have been considered the precursors of SWFs, or the
several forms of SWFs merged in the first years of the twenty-first century.39 And in any case, the
scope of the definition of SWFs—as narrowly or broadly understood—remains highly contested.40
Yet this is important to remember as SWFs continue to evolve. What emerges from the
examination of some of the developing state SWFs considered below41 is precisely that SWFs are
growing in fact beyond any effort to contain them formally within any sort of definition structures.
And indeed, the central insight that may be derived from a functional examination of SWFs in
developing states (whether or not resource management related), is that the expansion of the use
of SWFs may be creating a fundamental tension within the current formal analytic framework, as
the consequences of the form and function of SWFs established as a governance device may
begin to deviate in substantial respect from the more traditional SWFs established as an
instrument of macroeconomic policy.
Thus, while for the purposes of this article, those controversies about the scope of SWF
definition and the efforts to distinguish SWF typologies by objectives do not affect the focus of
analysis, it does suggest points of tension. Whether one is inclined to distinguish among
governmentally created facilities empowered to invest funds for particular purposes, the important
(and unifying) characteristic of all of them is the formation of the autonomous facility itself.
As funds, these facilities play an important role in structuring governance in those developing
states in which they are deployed. And the point here is that, however characterized, these funds
are both important for their fiscal effects as they are for their instrumental effects in disciplining
governance in the developing states in which they tend to be applied, in an important number of
instances, at the instance of IFIs.42
The World Bank has a long history of interest with stabilization funds, starting with the Chilean
stabilization fund it helped to organize in the 1980s.43 It has deep interests in consulting on these
funds, especially for client developing states.44 The IMF has long been interested in “nonrenewable
36Lawrence Summers, Opportunities in an era of large and growing official wealth, in SOVEREIGN WEALTH
MANAGEMENT 15 (Jennifer Johnson-Calari & Malan Rietveld, eds., 2008).
37Javier Santiso, SOVEREIGN DEVELOPMENT FUNDS: KEY FINANCIAL ACTORS OF THE SHIFTING WEALTH OF NATIONS (2008), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dev/41944381.pdf.
38Gelb, Tordo & Halland, supra note 19, at 1–2 (“and more are in the making, for example, Colombia, Morocco,
Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Many of the most recently created and planned SWFs
with a domestic investment mandate are in resource-rich countries”) (citing Ashby Monk, The Rise of Sovereign
Development Funds, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (Apr. 10, 2013, 1:00 PM), http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/blogarticle/
3189172/Blog/The-Rise-of-Sovereign-Development-Funds.html.
39See, e.g., Christopher Balding, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: THE NEW INTERSECTION OF MONEY AND POLITICS 18–20 (2012).
40Cf. Bassan, supra note 11.
41See infra Part III.
42See, e.g., Das, Lu, Mulder & Sy, supra note 3.
43See Balding, supra note 39, at 14–15.
44See e.g., infra Section III.B (discussing the World Bank’s involvement in the Mongolian SWF planning).
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resource funds (NRFs) to help in the implementation of fiscal policy.”45 Indeed, it was possible
to discern some substantial disciplinary potential in the device. “Such funds may help the
government to resist spending pressures if there are constraints on borrowing. These may reflect
explicit fiscal rules or may arise from political difficulties in issuing debt. In this case, by formally
limiting the resources available to the budget during upswings, funds could help to prevent large
increases in spending.”46 At least one later IMF sponsored study suggested the positive role of
stabilization funds as a component of fiscal discipline projects.47 Earlier studies had also
suggested the disciplinary effect of stabilization funds on resource rich countries.48 Development
funds serve a similar purpose, though they are more specifically targeted toward inbound
investment, rather than generally toward macroeconomic policy.49 They are now used to achieve a
variety of internal development and investment objectives, once the province of general
government policy.50
The difficulty for these funds are similar to those that touch on stabilization and pension funds,
that is, with funds whose objectives are not merely revenue protective or enhancing, but which
have other targeted objectives as well. For these funds, the issue touches both on efficiency
concerns (coherent macroeconomic policy) and legitimacy (policy and corruption issues).51
That report, however, warned that the move toward development of internal investment SWF
stabilization funds will have little positive effects and might have negative effects on internal
macro-fiscal policy.52 The warnings included fragmentation of public investment programs, the
weakening or bypassing of democratic institutions, a lack of oversight by market actors or
institutions, the exacerbation of the effects of asset price cycles, the weakening of the local
commercial banking sector, the potential for policy or objectives incoherence with the
government’s macro-fiscal policy, the redundancy with national development banks (especially
poorly run ones) and other institutions (causing inter-administrative competition, and reducing
incentives for reform of the development banking sector).53
Indeed, the connection between macro-financial policies and the legal and structural
environments of home states appear central to the operation of SWFs. “SWFs exist in their own
45Davis et al., supra note 26, at Overview.
46Id. (though the report also notes that such funds themselves may give effect to positive spending pressure).
A 2014 World Ban Report noted the importance of SWF structuring to reduce opportunities for corruption and the
politicization of macro economic policy. Alan Gelb, Silvana Tordo, Håvard Halland, Noora Arfaa & Gregory Smith,
Sovereign wealth funds and long-term development finance: risks and opportunities (The World Bank Poverty
Reduction and Economic Management Network Public Sector Governance Unit & Sustainable Development Network
Oil, Gas and Mining Unit, Policy Research Working Paper No. 6776, 2014), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/
external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2014/02/11/000158349_20140211115309/Rendered/PDF/WPS6776.pdf.
The authors suggested a three prong anti corruption approach—domestic investment projects and foreign assets
ought to compete for funds, the SSWFs ought to be partnered with well reputed international investors, and
investment decisions ought to be protected form the political process. But this approach also requires some
monitoring from host states. In early 2015, reports began circulating of U.S. government investigation of corruption by
large banks relating to their engagement with SWFs. See Nate Raymond and Aruna Viswanatha, BNY Mellon May Face
Bribery Charges Over Sovereign Wealth Funds: Filing, REUTERS, Jan. 27, 2015. Available http://www.reuters.com/article/
2015/01/27/us-bank-of-ny-melln-corruption-sec-idUSKBN0L02HM20150127.
47Naotaka Sugawara, From Volatility to Stability in Expenditure: Stabilization Funds in Resource-Rich Countries
(International Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/14/43, 2014), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
wp/2014/wp1443.pdf (“Using a panel data set of 68 resource-rich countries over 1988–2012, the results find that the
existence of stabilization funds contributes to smoothing government expenditure. The spending volatility in countries
that have established such funds is found to be 13 percent lower in the main estimation, and similar impacts are
found in robustness tests.”).
48See, e.g., Ugo Fasano, Review of the Experience with Oil Stabilization and Savings Funds in Selected Countries
(International Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/00/112, 2000); Jeffrey Davis, Rolando Ossowski, James Daniel &
Steven Barnett, OIL FUNDS: PROBLEMS POSING AS SOLUTIONS? FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 38 (2001), available at https://www.imf.
org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/12/davis.htm.
49Nicely described in Monk, supra note 38.
50Monk, supra note 38.
51See, e.g., Alan Gelb, Silvana Tordo, Håvard Halland, Noora Arfaa & Gregory Smith, Sovereign wealth funds and
long-term development finance: risks and opportunities (The World Bank Poverty Reduction and Economic
Management Network Public Sector Governance Unit & Sustainable Development Network Oil, Gas and Mining Unit,
Policy Research Working Paper No. 6776, 2014), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/
WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2014/02/11/000158349_20140211115309/Rendered/PDF/WPS6776.pdf.
52Id. (discussed in Mideast SWFs look within borders for opportunities, ZAWYA, Apr. 2, 2014, https://www.zawya.
com/story/Mideast_SWFs_look_within_borders_for_opportunities-ZAWYA20140402114827/).
53Id.
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domestic regulatory environments to conform to the broader political and economic ecology and
advance the investment objectives of home governments.”54 Put another way, SWFs contribute to
and are constrained by the governance environment of their home jurisdictions. Where these are
strong, SWFs may contribute positively to the rule of law and macro-finance policies of states; but
the opposite may also be true, that SWFs may contribute instrumentally to stronger governance in
weak governance states where IFI involvement in states which develop SWFs may also produce
SWF institutions that have a positive effect on governance.55 Thus, it is precisely these
“deficiencies” in the domestic sphere that, in states with weak governance or that may be subject
to corruption and lack of institutional discipline, but which are engaged with international norms
and standards through their connection with IFIs, might be viewed as states where the disciplinary
strengths of SWFs might serve internal governance and development objectives positively.
As the next section suggests, it is the ability to divert financial policy, and fiscal governance,
from the administrative or political institutions of the state into a self contained unit, that IFIs
sometimes view as a means of effecting fiscal discipline, internal development and reduce the
drag of institutionalized corruption. What makes this interesting from the perspective of SWF
development, is the role of IFIs in SWF development. A review of some recent efforts to establish
SWFs with a stabilization or development focus suggests the way in which these funds now may
better serve the project of fiscal and governance internationalization, and the development of
global policy coherence around the fiscal ideologies of IFIs, rather than as an instrument of
national policy. As such, stabilization and development SWFs may better serve financial
globalization than the particular interest of states establishing them precisely by transposing
global standards of fiscal and governance behavior into the internal workings of states. In this
sense, development and stabilization SWFs serve as an instrument of globalization from the top
down (through IFI policy operationalization) perhaps as effectively as SWFs that seek to project
national financial power through private market investments abroad.
III. DEVELOPMENT AND STABILIZATION FUNDS IN DEVELOPING STATES, IFI SOCIALIZATION
AND DISCIPLINARY TECHNIQUES
The movement toward the adoption of a set of common operational principles for SWF conduct,
the Santiago Principles, suggests a broader theme—the importance of building coherence within
the community of SWF states. That coherence might be developed from shared experiences
from the bottom up—as SWF states come together to develop common norms and expectations,56
and as they increasingly engage in economic transactions.57 That is the essence of organizations
like the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds and its predecessor organization, the
International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds.58 But coherence and socialization also
has a top down character, grounded in the nature of SWFs as intimately connected with global
finance. These top down efforts can be private,59 or public, the latter bound up in the institution
54Cf. Shai Bernstein, Josh Lerner & Antoinette Schoar, The Investment Strategies of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 27
J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 219 (2013) (greater involvement by political leaders results in greater propensity to adopt short
term value maximizing macroeconomic policies).
55See Truman, supra note 9, at 98–99.
56In a sense, that is the expectation of the organization of SWFs through the International Working Group of Sovereign
Wealth Funds and its Santiago Principles, as well as its successor organization the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth
Funds, “which will meet, exchange views on issues of common interest, and facilitate an understanding of the Santiago
Principles and SWF activities.” INTERNATIONAL FORUM OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, http://www.ifswf.org/. See also Larry Catá Backer,
Remarks presented at Chatham House for Conference, Africa’s Sovereign Wealth Funds: Demand, Development and
Delivery, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, United Kingdom: International Monitoring and Oversight:
Africa’s Increasing Presence (Sept. 5, 2014) (transcript available at http://www.backerinlaw.com/Site/podcasts/speeches-
and-remarks/international-monitoring-and-oversight-africas-increasing-presence-larry-cata-backer-remarks-presented-at-
chatham-house-for-conference-africas-sovereign-wealth-funds-demand-deve/).
57See, e.g., Scott E. Kalb, The Growing Trend of Cooperation among Sovereign Wealth Funds, in SOVEREIGN ASSET
MANAGEMENT FOR A POST CRISIS WORLD (Donghyun Park ed., 2011), available at https://www.kic.kr/_custom/kic/_common/
board/download.jsp.
58Indeed, the IWG served as a basic target population for studies of SWF community behaviors. See, e.g., Cornelia
Hammer, Peter Kunzel & Iva Petrova, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Current Institutional and Operational Practices
(International Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/08/254, 2008), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
wp/2008/wp08254.pdf. For the IFSWF, see http://www.ifswf.org/.
59See, e.g., Edwin M. Truman, A Blueprint for SWF Best Practices, 9 REVUE D’ECONOMIE FINANCIERE 429 (2009), available
at http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/ecofi_1767-4603_2009_hos_9_1_5526.
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building and macro-finance objectives of IFIs.60 This section examines a number of the smaller
and more recent SWF structures to understand the way that IFI interests and SWF objectives have
come to interact in SWF operationalization. It also suggests the tensions generated by the
consequences of SWF objectives, particularly as between stabilization and development objectives.
At their limits, they have suggested the need to examine the utility of the SWF device itself,61
though it is not clear whether the most important quality of the SWF goes to its macro-finance
elements or its disciplinary power in weak governance states. Though the focus is global—the
current effects are mostly felt in developing African states.
A. Chilean Pension Reserve Fund and Economic and Social Stabilization Fund62
Like other states whose funding for their SWFs are derived from the exploitation of natural
resources, Chile has developed two funds for distinct purposes: a Pension Reserve Fund and an
Economic and Social Stabilization Fund.63 Unlike many SWFs established to create a disciplinary
fiscal structure around the exploitation of petroleum, the foundation of Chile’s funds was copper
and related extractives.64 The Pension Reserve Fund (PRF) (Fondo de Reservas de Pensiones or
FRP) was created in 2006.65 This was followed shortly thereafter in 2007 by the establishment of
the Economic and Social Stabilization Fund (ESSF) (Fondo de Estabilización Económica y Social or
FEES).66 Both fall under the jurisdiction of the Chilean Ministry of Finance (Ministerio de Hacienda).
60It is important to remember in the discussion that follows that IFIs had been involved in sovereign investment
for development and in the context of fiscal stabilization long before the possibilities of using SWFs in aid of these
objectives arose in this century. Some states have always sought use of SWFs as governance/discipline instruments,
for example Azerbaijan, Norway, and Russia, even without the prompting of IFIs. For Russia, see, e.g., Larry Catá
Backer, Part 17 Russian SWFs–Reimaging the State in the Global Sphere: An Inventory of Sovereign Wealth Funds as
Regulator and Participant in Global Markets, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Mar. 1, 2014, 11:09 AM), http://lcbackerblog.
blogspot.com/2014/03/part-17-russian-swfs-reimaging-state-in.html. States have also long turned to the SWF as an
appropriate form through which they could structure domestic/regional development, for example, the Russian and
some Gulf state SWFs and the Korean SWF. On the latter, see, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Part 12: Korea Investment
Corporation–Reimaging the State in the Global Sphere: An Inventory of Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulator and
Participant in Global Markets, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Feb. 23, 2014, 10:50 PM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/
2014/02/part-12-korea-investment-corporation.html. Initially though, and still among many students of the subject,
a purely domestic fund would not count as an SWF. See, e.g., discussion in GAPP, supra note 25, at 28.
61“Resource-rich African countries are busy setting up sovereign wealth funds, but critics say the funds may not
serve the long-term interests of poor countries that still need to invest in basics such as schools and roads.” African
Countries Race To Build Sovereign Wealth Funds, AFRICAN GLOBE, Feb. 14, 2014, http://www.africanglobe.net/business/
african-countries-race-build-sovereign-wealth-funds/.
62Further discussed in Larry Catá Backer, Part 3: Chile Pension Reserve Fund and Economic and Social
Stabilization Fund–Reimaging the State in the Global Sphere: An Inventory of Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulator
and Participant in Global Markets, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Feb. 4, 2014, 7:12 PM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/
2014/02/part-3-chile-pension-reserve-fund-and.html.
63See Ley 20.128 (Sobre Responsabilidad Fiscal) (Fiscal Responsibility Law of 2006), available at http://www.
hacienda.cl/fondos-soberanos/legislacion/ley-20-128-sobre-responsabilidad-fiscal.html. The FRL has been modified,
supplemented and amended since 2006. These changes may be accessed at http://www.hacienda.cl/fondos-
soberanos/legislacion.html.
64See Erling Steigum, Sovereign wealth funds for macroeconomic purposes, RAPPORT TILL FINANSPOLITISKA RÅDET
2013/4 6, http://www.finanspolitiskaradet.se/download/18.11165b2c13cf48416debd70/1380290120811/Underlags
rapportþ2013-4þSteigum.pdf.
65Per the Ministry of Finance:
The Pension Reserve Fund (PRF) was . . . set up in response to Chile’s new demographic scenario
characterized by an increase in life expectancy and the growth of senior citizen population . . . .
The PRF’s objective is to support financing of government obligations arising from the government’s
guarantee to basic old-age and disability solidarity pensions and solidarity pension contributions
arising from the pension reform . . . . Pursuant to the Responsibility Law, PRF’s capital increases each
year by an amount equivalent to 0.2% of the previous year’s gross domestic product (GDP). If the
actual fiscal surplus exceeds 0.2% of GDP, the PRF receives a contribution equivalent to said surplus,
up to a maximum of 0.5% of GDP. This accumulation rule allows for new resources to be allocated to
the fund in any given year regardless of the fiscal situation facing the country each year.
Pension Reserve Fund, GOBIERNO DE CHILE MINISTRY OF FINANCE, http://www.hacienda.cl/english/sovereign-wealth-funds/
pension-reserve-fund.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).
66The Ministry of Finance describes its ESSF as follows:
The Economic and Social Stabilization Fund (ESSF) was . . . derived from the old Copper Stabilization
Fund, which was replaced by the ESSF. The Economic and Social Stabilization Fund allows financing of
fiscal deficits and amortization of public debt. Thus, the ESSF provides fiscal spending stabilization
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But these funds are the products of a longer history, one in which free market advocates within
Chile joined forces with a powerful IFI, the World Bank, to create and manage a SWF
instrumentally to achieve economic and governance objectives. Christopher Baling relates the
origins of the Chilean funds in the Chilean Social and Economic Stabilization Fund.67 The CSESF
was created in 1985 and funded in part with a loan from the World Bank.68 It was designed
instrumentally as a disciplinary mechanism insulated from internal political pressure with the
objective of attaining clear macro-fiscal stabilization goals. “Despite SEFs’ reputation as economic
nationalists, the Chilean economic reformers who helped establish the CSESF were committed
economic libertarians. Coming from the Chicago school of free market economics and having
studied with Milton Friedman, they felt that a stabilization fund provided a path both to restrain
government largesse and control money.”69
The disciplinary objectives were grounded in the focus of the fund itself. “The CSESF was not
intended to expand government control of the economy or assets but rather to restrain its
influence.”70 The Chilean experience was to serve as a model, first for the World Bank, and then
for the IMF in its own conditional lending programs.71 And the instrumental purposes of
stabilization funding would also carry over to development funds, which were expected to serve
similar purposes. But the experience was not without some drawbacks. Principal among them was
that, while the fund served to discipline government, it was not autonomous enough of the
political order to avoid less disciplined drawdowns.72 In some states, weak governance culture
could not be overcome through the operations of a fund.73 Still, by 2000, it was possible for some
to conclude that “stabilization schemes have been more successful in countries with a strong
commitment to fiscal discipline and sound macroeconomic management.”74 The question,
thereafter, was whether these finds could be used to build commitment to fiscal discipline and
sound macroeconomic management.
It was this ideology, updated to reflect the changes in global markets brought about since the
1980s, that framed the modern incarnations of Chilean sovereign investing. From the start, the
objectives of these SWFs were to provide fiscal discipline and restraint as well as to serve as a
source for funding future public wealth transfer payments in the form of pensions and related
obligations.75 Instead, like its sister fund in Ghana, the SWFs are viewed as externally financed
disciplinary means of effecting macroeconomic policy by meeting the internal financial and
development needs of Chile– the protection against adverse effects of global cycles and the need
to ensure the financing of social welfare obligations.76 In the Funds’ 2012 Annual Report the
Finance Minister noted:
Footnote continued
since it reduces its dependency on global business cycles and revenue’s volatility derived from
fluctuations of copper price and other sources . . . ESSF receives each year the positive balance
resulting from the difference between the effective fiscal surplus and the contributions to the Pension
Reserve Fund and to the Central Bank of Chile, discounting the payment of public debt and advances
made the year before.
Economic and Social Stabilization Fund, GOBIERNO DE CHILE MINISTRY OF FINANCE, http://www.hacienda.cl/english/sovereign-
wealth-funds/economic-and-social-stabilization-fund.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).
67See Balding, supra note 39, at 14–15.
68Balding, supra note 39, at 14.
69Balding, supra note 39, at 14.
70Balding, supra note 39, at 15.
71“Impressed with the results, the World Bank advised its country clients to copy the Chilean stabilization fund
model.” Balding, supra note 39, at 15.
72See, e.g., Fasano, supra note 48, at 9 (used to repay foreign debt to the Chilean central bank and subsidize
domestic gasoline prices).
73See Nina Budina et al., Nigeria’s Growth Record: Dutch Disease or Debt Overhang? (World Bank Policy Research,
Working Paper No. 4256, 2007); Davis, Ossowski, Daniel & Barnett, supra note 48.
74Fasano, supra note 48, at 19.
75For an analysis, see, e.g., Teresa Dabán, Strengthening Chile’s Rule-Based Fiscal Framework (International
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/11/17, 2010), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/
wp1117.pdf.
76See Andrew Ang, The Four Benchmarks of Sovereign Wealth Funds, COLUMBIA BUSINESS SCHOOL 11 (Oct. 10, 2010),
http://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/sites/financialstudies/files/files/The%20Four%20Benchmarks%20of%20Sovereign%
20Wealth%20Funds.pdf (“Recently in 2010, Chile used proceeds from its SWF to help rebuild earthquake-damaged
areas.”).
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One of Chile’s most important reputational assets is its fiscal policy, which is anchored in
a structural income rule in which current expenditures are determined as a function of long-term
revenue, not current revenue. This rule, which has received wide international recognition, makes
public spending sustainable while also providing a series of virtuous effects at the
macroeconomic level: it generates countercyclical public spending, is naturally aligned with
monetary policy, contributes to exchange rate stability and sets a de facto limit on public debt.77
It is in this sense that the SWF global objectives can be understood: “The sovereign wealth funds
are the property of all Chileans. They are a national asset that provides stability in social spending
and public investment.”78 That stability is understood as producing macroeconomic benefits
through fiscal discipline. “The Chilean government maintains favorable access to debt markets and
remains a net creditor due to low debt levels and large balances in sovereign wealth funds.”79
Both the PRF and the ESSF are organized as an account in the Central Bank of Chile. The SWFs
investment is not principally index driven, but involves active management by third parties through the
Central Bank and subject to oversight by the Finance Ministry. The investment guidelines for the
pension fund80 are quite conservative.81 Most of its assets have been invested in public bonds,
though there is movement into equities.82 More interesting for the purposes of this article are the
investment guidelines for the ESSF.83 “In keeping with the ESSF’s objectives, the main aim of its
investment policy is to maximize the fund’s accumulated value in order to partially cover cyclical
reductions in fiscal revenues while maintaining a low level of risk.”84 In other respects, the investment
guidelines for both funds are substantially similar. Both funds may be operated through arrangements
with paid third party service providers to handle investments.85 The Ministry of Finance has overall
control of investment policy and the administration of the Funds.86 Responsible investment focused
outward from Chile, on the Norwegian model, does not appear to play a large role in SWF
management. Indeed, the SWFs are either conservatively administered or inwardly turned. Instead,
the benefits of the use of SWFs as part of the disciplinary fiscal policy of Chile is emphasized.87
77Annual Report Sovereign Wealth Funds 2012, GOBIERNO DE CHILE MINISTRY OF FINANCE 6 (Dec. 31, 2012), http://www.
hacienda.cl/english/sovereign-wealth-funds/annual-report/annual-report-sovereign-wealth-funds-525723.html
(last visited Oct. 7, 2014) (forward by the Minister, Felipe Larraín).
78What is the policy on transparency for Chile’s sovereign wealth funds?, GOBIERNO DE CHILE MINISTRY OF FINANCE,
http://www.hacienda.cl/english/sovereign-wealth-funds/frequently-asked-questions/what-is-the-policy-on-transparency-
for.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).
79International Monetary and Financial Committee Twenty-Ninth Meeting, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 10
(Apr. 12, 2014), http://www.imf.org/External/spring/2014/imfc/statement/eng/chl.pdf (statement by the Honorable
Rodrigo Vergara, Governor, Central Bank of Chile on behalf of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay).
80Investment Guidelines (in Spanish), GOBIERNO DE CHILE MINISTRY OF FINANCE Ord. 1925, Oficio No. 1637 de 2011, IBR/
FVM/LCI E6114/2013 (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.hacienda.cl/english/sovereign-wealth-funds/pension-reserve-fund/
investment-policy/investment-guidelines-in-spanish.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).
81Annual Report Sovereign Wealth Funds 2011, GOBIERNO DE CHILE MINISTRY OF FINANCE 45 (Dec. 31, 2011), http://www.
hacienda.cl/english/sovereign-wealth-funds/annual-report/annual-report-sovereign-wealth-funds-483.html
(last visited Oct. 7, 2014).
82
The new scheme moves closer to a Type D fund (15% in equities), which is more in line with the return
objectives and risk profile identified for the PRF. In sum, the risk tolerance remains low, while the
investment policy is more consistent with the underlying liability that needs to be financed in the future.
Id. at 46.
83Investment Guidelines (in Spanish), GOBIERNO DE CHILE MINISTRY OF FINANCE Ord. 1267, Oficio No. 433 de 2011, IBR/
FVM/LCI E6114/2013 (June 4, 2013) [ESSF Investment Guidelines], http://www.hacienda.cl/english/sovereign-wealth-
funds/economic-and-social-stabilization-fund/investment-policy/investment-guidelines-in-spanish.html
(last visited Oct. 7, 2014).
84Investment Policy, GOBIERNO DE CHILE MINISTRY OF FINANCE, http://www.hacienda.cl/english/sovereign-wealth-funds/
economic-and-social-stabilization-fund/investment-policy.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2014) (“Its risk aversion is reflected by
the choice of an investment portfolio with a high level of liquidity and low credit risk and volatility, thereby ensuring the
availability of the resources to cover fiscal deficits and preventing significant losses in the fund’s value.”).
85Chile, ESSF Investment Guidelines, supra., § I.2.
86Id., §I.3
87Thus, for example, in its 2013 Consultation, the IMF noted:
Gross assets include the two sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) as well as other instruments. The
stabilization fund (ESSF) currently stands at about 512 percent of GDP and represents a flexible fiscal
buffer that can be used to cover deficits and amortizations. The pension reserve fund (PRF) stands at
about 214 percent and is earmarked to cover a fraction of pension related outlays starting in 2016.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 13/198 26 (2013), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
scr/2013/cr13198.pdf.
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The Chilean SWFs are important as a template tool for macro-finance governance. They also
serve as important instruments for institutional discipline in states where there is reason to build a
measure of distance between the organs of state, and institutions driving fiscal policy. Its origins
in Washington Consensus premises are clear.88 That, in itself, makes the SWF device, as a
stabilization, savings and development instrument, particularly attractive to IFIs seeking to broaden
their governance toolkits in ways that advance their political and investment ideologies. And over
the last several years, it appears that IFIs, and especially the IMF, have again turned to the SWF
device as a tool for fostering fiscal discipline, insulating macroeconomic policy from the vagaries
of the institutions of developing democracies (shifting it toward administrative rather than political
governance), and as a tool for fostering good governance patterns in the state sector (especially
as an anti-corruption tool).
B. Mongolia Fiscal Stability Fund (MFSF)89
The Mongolia Fiscal Stability Fund (MFSF) was established in 2010 under the terms of a Fiscal
Stability Law passed that year by the Mongolian Parliament. It succeeded and to some extent
supplemented earlier legislation developed pursuant to a Comprehensive National Development
Strategy90 that had “created a Human Development Fund (HD Fund) with the ambitious goal
of bringing Mongolia’s human development status to the same level as that of the developed
countries by 2020.”91 The MFSF was created, like those of other developing states with few
government resources and large deposits of exploitable natural resources, to promote fiscal
stability, especially in the face of swings in commodity prices (principally copper and gold),
and to promote good governance.92 Outside analysts, at the time of the creation of the MFSF
were not convinced that the state was stable enough and its governance cultures deep
enough to implement its plans for the MFSF.93 These analysts do recognize the appeal of
88And, indeed, the term Washington Consensus, without its disparaging neo-liberal additions, may well have its
origins in the development of global free market and rule of law premises by Washington based IFIs directed toward
reform in Latin America in the late 1980s. See, e.g., John Williamson, Did the Washington Consensus Fail?, PETERSON
INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, Nov. 6, 2002, http://www.piie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID¼488;
John Williamson, What Should the World Bank Think About the Washington Consensus?, 15 INT’L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION
AND DEV. 251, available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1093/wbro/15.2.251.
89Further discussed in Larry Catá Backer, Part 23 Mongolia Fiscal Stability Fund (MFSF)–Reimaging the State in
the Global Sphere: An Inventory of Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulator and Participant in Global Markets, LAW AT THE
END OF THE DAY (Mar. 19, 2014, 9:01 PM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/part-23-mongolia-fiscal-stability-
fund.html.
90Endorsement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)-based Comprehensive National Development
Strategy of Mongolia, MOF, Feb. 12, 2008, http://mofa.gov.mn/coordination/images/stories/resource_docs/nds
_approved_eng.pdf.
91See Alicia Campi, Opinion: Mongolia’s Quest to Balance Human Development in its Booming Mineral-Based
Economy Brookings, BROOKINGS (Jan. 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/01/10-mongolia-
campi#_ftn13. The Human Development Fund was itself a successor to an earlier fund.
The Mongolian Development Fund (MDF) was set up by law in 2007. The Human Development Fund
(HDP) was established by law, and replaced the MDF, in 2009. The main purpose of these funds were
to accumulate the excess revenues from mining sector, and to target the resource for the economic/
human development of the country.
Khuyagtsogt Ognon, Director, Wealth Fund Division, MOF: Sovereign Wealth Fund: Case of Mongolia, High Level Policy
Seminar on Managing Revenues and Optimizing the Benefits of Coal and Gas Resources in Mozambique, African
Development Bank Group Presentation (Feb. 19, 2013), available at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/
Documents/Generic-Documents/Presentation%20-%20Sovereign%20Wealth%20Fund%20-%20Case%20of%20
Mongolia.pps.
92As one commentator noted:
A Fiscal Stability Law, passed by parliament in 2010, should begin to exert some much-needed
discipline on the government’s budgetary policies. The law . . . created a stabilization fund, to be
financed by mining revenues, intended to help the government cushion the impact of commodity price
swings on the Mongolian economy. Even more important, the government is considering the creation
of a sovereign wealth fund that would safeguard some of the country’s mineral windfall for future
generations.
Press Release, Loch Adamson, Institutional Investor via Origo Partners, Mongolia Aims to Join the SWF Ranks (2011)
available at http://www.origoplc.com/press/institutional-investor-mongolia-aims-to-join-the-swf-ranks/.
93Id.
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what they call resource nationalism,94 and its manifestation in the techniques of sovereign
wealth funds.95
The MFSF is among the smaller global SWFs. It was reported in 2012 that “Mongolia’s Fiscal
Stability fund, is believed to have less than $10m after being founded last year.”96 And despite the
rhetorical flourishes and good intentions with which it was created, to date the SWFs has not
produced much savings. “The money accumulation to the Fund has been reducing year after year
since 2012, due to mining sector’s hardship and coal’s lowering prices.” In 2012, when the fund was
set up by the law on Budget stability, a total of 94.7 billion Togrog was accumulated, but this sum
reduced to 49 billion in 2013. The money, accumulated so far in the fund, has not been used yet.97
As in many states in similar economic and resource circumstances, the Mongolian approach to
SWFs produced a move toward fund specialization. “In addition to the stabilization fund, the
government has been preparing legislation for the creation of a national pension reserve fund,
akin to Chile’s $4 billion Pension Reserve Fund and Norway’s mammoth $612 billion Government
Pension Fund Global.”98 This pension fund would also derive its income from commodity derived
income and then invested to ensure adequate financing of Mongolia’s social programs. To that
end, the Mongolian state sought counsel from the World Bank.99 But internal development in
Mongolia is also meant to be funded through its recently established Development Bank.
In 2011 the Mongolian government created a state-owned development bank with a
mandate to finance railroads, roads, power plants, and water supply . . . . The government
guarantees the debt issued by the development bank, which is now a contingent liability
that will have to be backed by future mining revenues.100
Further impetus for the establishment of a SWF came from the International Monetary Fund,
which, as in the cases of its investment in other developing states, viewed with favor the
establishment of such a fiscal disciplinary device.
Directors emphasized the need for a clear policy to ensure that the Development Bank of
Mongolia (DBM) can help meet the long-term infrastructure needs of Mongolia in a macro-
economically sustainable manner with minimal fiscal risks. In particular, public investment
projects financed by the DBM should be taken into account when setting the path of fiscal
policy, consistent with the new fiscal framework. Directors welcomed efforts to explore the
establishment of a sovereign wealth fund, which could be an important complement to
the fiscal framework.101
The IMF Staff Report also noted “Implementation of the [2012 Social Welfare Law] should be a
priority and the establishment of a sovereign wealth fund would be an important complement to
the FSL’s counter cyclical fiscal policy framework.”102 Indeed, in order to understand the
94Jessica Morris, Why Resource Nationalism Could be Increasing, CNBC NEWS (Feb. 7, 2014, 9:46 AM) http://www.
cnbc.com/id/101399000 (“Resource nationalism describes a government’s effort to gain greater benefit from its
natural resources — sometimes to the detriment of private companies. This can range from outright expropriation —
when a government takes away a company’s assets — to more creeping forms of appropriation, such as higher
taxation or more arduous regulation.”). But see Nick Holland, Resource nationalism can mean growth and prosperity,
BUSINESS DAY LIVE (Aug. 16, 2013, 8:53 AM) http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2013/08/16/resource-nationalism-can-mean-
growth-and-prosperity.
95Adamson, supra note 92.
96William Hutchings, Sovereign wealth firepower tops $5 trillion, FINANCIAL NEWS, May 8, 2012, http://www.efinanci
alnews.com/story/2012-05-08/sovereign-wealth-funds-firepower-five-trillion?ea9c8a2de0ee111045601ab04d673622.
97Sugirragchaa, Stabilization fund to receive 29.8 billion togrog, MONTSAME, Jan. 17, 2014, http://www.montsame.
gov.mn/en/index.php/economics/item/3978-stabilization-fund-to-receive-29-8-billion-togrog.
98Adamson, supra note 92.
99See WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA - POLICY OPTIONS FOR PENSION REFORM (2011), available at http://documents.worldbank.org/
curated/en/2011/01/16662950/mongolia-policy-options-pension-reform.
100
The inventory of possible projects is large by any standard. Mongolia scores 118 out of 142 countries
in quality of infrastructure, as rated by the Global Competitiveness Report 2011–2012 (in comparison,
other countries with large mining sectors like Chile rank 41st, Peru 88th, and Botswana 92nd). The
majority of roads are unpaved. The funding requirements for rail lines alone run in the multibillion
dollar range, in comparison to Mongolian GDP of $3 billion in 2010.
Theodore H. Moran, Avoiding the “Resource Curse” in Mongolia, PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 3, July 2013,
http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb13-18.pdf.
101INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 12/230 3 (2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/scr/2012/cr12320.pdf.
102Id. at { 57.
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establishment of the MFSF, one must understand the intermeshing of international financial
institutions (World Bank and International Monetary Fund), their development of fiscal
management principles, and their coordination of client states in the implementation of these
principles across the globe. This was noted in a recent World Bank related report:
As part of its reform efforts and with the assistance of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the government began an intensive south-south
exchange, notably with Chile, another major copper producer, on strengthening the policy
environment. The dialogue proved critical in the passage of several landmark laws within
the space of a few years, including a fiscal stability law modeled after Chile, and the
accompanying integrated budget and procurement and social welfare laws.103
It is in this sense that the MFSF can be understood as a disciplinary tool and as an anti-
corruption measure. The MFSF facility was also meant to incorporate international standards and
norms, both as to objectives and governance. It was a product of socialization of Mongolian
political economy and governance frameworks within the premises for fiscal and governance
management championed by IFIs, incorporating the standards and behavior premises of the
community of SWFs and IFIs.104
Mongolia’s leaders, some educated at Harvard and Cambridge, say they are determined to
avoid this syndrome, known as “Dutch Disease” – a sudden surge in wealth that
ultimately hampers expansion. Working with the Washington-based World Bank, they are
dispatching officials to nations such as Chile, which successfully harnessed its copper
resources to help drive growth. They are also leveraging their democratic system to build
support for policies including greater investment in transportation and a new budget law
aimed at curbing the impact of volatile metals prices.105
And in the process of socialization, Mongolia’s SWF architecture is also meant to save it from its
own internal and democratic politics, by taking away the temptation to overspend.106 The MFSF
was modeled on the Chilean Stabilization Fund,107 It was established after substantial
transnational consultation, and with the advice of IFIs.108
Intermeshing is an important notion in the construction of “cultures” of sovereign wealth funds
common to states understood as occupying similar socioeconomic sovereign space. The concept
was developed by the German academic, Gunther Teubner in the context of theorizing the
development of governance systems in globalization.109 For Teubner, intermeshing involves the
103See Rogier van den Brink, Arshad Sayed, Steve Barnett, Eduardo Aninat, Eric Parrado, Zahid Hasnain & Tehmina
Khan, THE WORLD BANK, SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION: HOW MONGOLIA LEARNED FROM CHILE ON MANAGING A MINERAL-RICH ECONOMY (2012),
available at http://www.mad-mongolia.com/wp-content/files_mf/southsouthcooperationhowmongolialearnedfromchi
leontradeandthecompetitivenessage.pdf; see also Adam B. Robbins, THE WORLD BANK, CASE STUDY: WORLD BANK ENGAGEMENT
WITH MONGOLIA’S SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND (2014), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/03/13/000442464_20140313112629/Rendered/PDF/
858180BRI0REPL00Box382147B00PUBLIC0.pdf.
104This communalization of SWF operationalization and normative structures occurs outside the International Forum
of Sovereign Wealth Funds as well as within it. See, e.g., Ebrima Faal, Director, Southern Africa Resource Center
(SARC), High Level Policy Seminar on Managing Revenues and Optimizing the Benefits of Coal and Gas Resources in
Mozambique - Conclusions and the Way Forward, African Development Bank Group (Feb. 20, 2013), available at
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/High%20Level%20Policy%20Seminar%
20on%20Managing%20Revenues%20and%20Optimizing%20the%20Benefits%20of%20Coal%20and%20Gas%20
Resources%20in%20Mozambique%20%20-%20Conclusions%20and%20the%20Way%20Forward.pdf.
105Michael Forsythe, Mongolian Harvard Elites Aim for Wealth Without ‘Dutch Disease’, BLOOMBERG,
(Feb. 15, 2010, 16:01), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid¼newsarchive&sid ¼ aONmVLraqtO8.
106
Sanjaasuren Oyun, a 12-year parliamentary veteran with a doctorate in earth sciences from Cambridge
University in the U.K., said she is pushing the government to avoid politically popular cash dividends
for citizens and focus on infrastructure improvements and job growth. “Because poverty and
unemployment are still the most pressing issues in this country, it is easy to win the vote by promising
cash,” Oyun said in an interview. “But members of both parties in parliament are saying that in the
future, these promises should not be made.”
Id.
107See Campi, supra note 91.
108See, e.g., IMF Executive Board Concludes 2012 Article IV Consultation and Third Post-Program Monitoring with
Mongolia, Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 12/131, Nov. 21, 2012.
109See Gunther Teubner, The Corporate Codes of Multinationals: Company Constitutions Beyond Corporate
Governance and Co-Determination, in CONFLICT OF LAWS AND LAWS OF CONFLICT IN EUROPE AND BEYOND: PATTERNS OF SUPRANATIONAL
AND TRANSNATIONAL JURIDIFICATION (Rainer Nickel ed., 2009).
Page 14 of 26
Backer. International Review of Law 2015:swf.5
Europeanization of multinational regulatory enterprises. Just as the member states of the European
Union together might create broader and more powerfully effective cross-state norms, so too might
multinational “states” do the same within cooperative regulatory communities. Thus he notes
“the emergence of inter-company networks as an extension of the corporate code onto an entire
production network. Global commodity chains have developed, which constitute neither market
relationships nor integrated multinationals.”110 These are “networks of independent companies,
which have generated their own governance structures.”111 In the context of SWFs, intermeshing
involves the internationalization of sovereign investing through the nexus institutions of the IMF
and World Bank. These serve to create regulatory communities bound together through the
economic power of the IFIs.
It is in this context that one can understand the inter-connectedness, the intermeshing, of the
Mongolian Fiscal Stability Law of 2010, the IFIs and the establishment of the MFSF under the
tutelage of the Chilean SWF managers. “Mongolia passed its Fiscal Stability Law in 2010 as part of
its Stand By Agreement with the IMF which expired on the 30th of September 2010.”112 Beyond
the IMF, the World Bank has also supplied its technical assistance capacity in the service of
socialization and conformity of Mongolian planning to international norms.113 “The World Bank
has been supporting the Mongolian government to improve the design of their sovereign wealth
fund. The MTAP [Multi-Sectoral Technical Assistance Project] and Governance Partnership
Facility provided funds to support the Ministry of Finance with this task. Central to support
has been involvement of experts from Chile and in organizing an international conference
on SWFs.”114
C. Fundo Soberano de Angola (Angola SWF)115
The Fundo Soberano de Angola (Angola SWF) (FSA)116 represents an interesting effort to use SWF
forms to discipline spending. Yet, it is also one in which the almost picture perfect formal
organization has been undermined in function by intimations of corruption. This may then
represent a case where IFI and state efforts to construct an autonomous disciplinary facility might
not be sufficient to overcome the structural patterns of politics that produce weak governance.
FSA is also notable for making explicit the agenda of international development and lending
organizations, like the International Monetary Fund, to use SWFs instrumentally as a disciplinary
tool that ought to be in the toolkit of developing states with large reserves of natural resources,
especially petroleum.117 These efforts were directly tied to consultations in connection with IMF
lending.
Angola, Africa’s second-biggest oil producer, is starting a sovereign wealth fund with $5
billion in assets to ease the impact of commodity price volatility that prompted an
International Monetary Fund loan three years ago . . . . The IMF promoted setting up a fund
and cutting the quasi- fiscal operations of the state oil company Sonangol when it loaned
the nation $1.3 billion after crude prices fell in 2008.118
110Id. at 9.
111Id.
112Richard Dutu, Managing Mongolia’s Wealth: Constructing and Stimulating a Formula for the Fiscal Stability Fund,
2nd Report, 5-8-2012 § 4.4.1, MOF, http://mof.gov.mn/wp-content/uploads/resource/MANAGING%20MONGOLIA%27S
%20WEALTH.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2014).
113Robbins, supra note 103, at 3, 4. Robbins, supra note 103, at 1 (“Beginning in 2008, the World Bank and
Mongolia have worked together to improve the country’s mineral revenue management framework, drafted and
passed a rule-based fiscal policy law, maintained dialogue of fiscal policy, and pursued the design of an effective
Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF).”).
114Robbins, supra note 103, at 3 (“Policy dialogue was extended to discussion of the objectives of the fund and its
governance . . . . Panama, Colombia, and other countries have also adopted rule based fiscal policies with integrated
SWFs that perform counter-cyclical functions.”).
115Discussed more fully in Larry Catá Backer, Part 18 Fundo Soberano de Angola (Angola SWF)–Reimaging the
State in the Global Sphere: An Inventory of Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulator and Participant in Global Markets,
LAW AT THE END OF THE DAy (Mar. 2, 2014, 8:19 PM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/part-18-fundo-soberano-
de-angola-angola.html.
116Official website may be accessed at http://www.fundosoberano.ao/language/en/.
117See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 12/215 19, 38 (2012), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr12215.pdf.
118Candido Mendes & Colin McClelland, Angola Starts Sovereign Wealth Fund With $5 Billion, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 17,
2012, 10:42 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-17/angola-starts-sovereign-wealth-fund-with-5-billion.html.
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By 2011 Angola was reporting to the IMF about its efforts to establish what it then
called an Oil for Infrastructure Fund.119 This fund was to serve as the basis for a stabilization
Fund.120
Building on this, the IMF proposed that this facility be used as a fiscal buffer to protect the
Angolan government from itself.121 The IMF Report noted that “under an OIF-like mechanism,
Angola would be able to set aside excess revenues in a stabilization fund while gradually scaling
up investment. In the event of a repeat of the 2008 oil price shock, investment program could go
forth uninterrupted by drawing on the resources set aside in the stabilization fund.”122 The global
investment community viewed this possibility positively.123 In November 2008, President José
Eduardo dos Santos announced the establishment of a commission to establish a SWF that would
target internal development, and the Fondo Soberano de Angola was formally constituted
in 2011.124
The FSA is formally structured to conform to international standards. Indeed, Angola is a
member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds.125 And the FSA has worked hard
to construct a set of formal structures that appear to implement most of the core requirements of
the Santiago Principles.126 The FSA’s organizational structure is unexceptional and conforms
generally to the Santiago Principles for autonomous organization under the guidance of the
state.127
The FSA is meant to serve as a stabilization fund, development facility and a mechanism for
fiscal discipline. While the FSA is empowered to invest globally, it has indicated a preference for
local investment. Under some definitions, this would make this something other than a SWF, but
the form has now outgrown definitions that though relatively new (back in 2005), are now
outpaced by the changes in the SWF universe.128 Among projects initially identified for promotion
are a dedicated Hotel Fund to promote the hospitality sector and projects to finance infrastructure
119 In the medium term, we see a need to enact policies that avoid the disruption caused by the boom-
bust cycles associated with oil price volatility . . . . For the time being, an Oil for Infrastructure Fund
was set up in February 2011 (but is not yet operational) in order to secure financing for very high
priority investments, mainly in water and energy.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 11/346 { 31 (2011), available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/scr/2011/cr11346.pdf.
120“We are continuing to consider alternative fiscal rule, perhaps to be formalized in legislation for a stabilization
fund, which would help to smooth public spending over the oil price cycle and prevent the disruptive and sharp
contraction of investment spending recorded in 2009–10.” Id. at { 31.
121
The OIF should be used as a fiscal buffer. To be effective in this regard, the OIF would need to be fully
funded, and withdrawals judiciously managed until absorption capacity is strengthened. This would
allow a gradual scaling up of investment, and protect priority projects from detrimental stops and
starts. The OIF could also help sterilize liquidity.
IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 12/215, supra note 117, at { 56.
122IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 12/215, supra note 117, at { 6.
123“Angola’s decision to set up a sovereign wealth fund is positive news, Fitch Ratings says. It reaffirms our view
that government policies are reducing the economy’s exposure to movements in the oil price, and laying a
foundation for sustainable growth.” Sovereign Wealth Fund Plan Positive for Angola, FITCH RATINGS, Oct 23, 2012),
https://www.fitchratings.com/gws/en/fitchwire/fitchwirearticle/Sovereign-Wealth-Fund?pr_id¼765930. It was reported
at the time of its establishment that the “money will target domestic agriculture, water, power generation and
transportation to attract foreign investment to Angolan infrastructure projects, according to fund documents. Hotel
projects including a hospitality school in Angola are part of the fund’s plans.” Mendes & McClelland, supra note 118.
124Overview, FUNDO SOBERANO DE ANGOLA, http://www.fundosoberano.ao/about-fsdea/.
125The FUNDO SOBERANO DE ANGOLA website explains:
The Fundo Soberano de Angola was established in accordance with international governance
standards and best practices as stated in the Santiago Principles and in the future the Fund will be
rated by the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index. The Fundo Soberano de Angola is committed to
operating transparently, responsibly and in full compliance with the laws and regulations of Angola
and the countries where it will make future investments.
Id.
126Discussed in id.
127Described in Organizational Structure, FUNDO SOBERANO DE ANGOLA, http://www.fundosoberano.ao/governance/.
128The Fundo Soberano de Angola “considers investing across Africa and globally, it has a strong focus on
investments in the domestic market, building Angola’s infrastructure and creating opportunities for the citizens of
Angola.” Investment Strategy, FUNDO SOBERANO DE ANGOLA, http://www.fundosoberano.ao/investments/.
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projects in Sub-Saharan Africa.129 Interestingly, it also includes a social charter that, were it to be
operationalized to any significant degree, would serve as an innovative and useful mechanism for
economic progress among the poorer segments of a political community.130 “Through the Social
Charter, the Fundo Soberano de Angola supports social programs and partners with aid agencies
through its social impact program that is set out to reach the communities across Angola and
other jurisdictions it invests directly.”131 On the other hand, the embrace of a central planning
model by FAS raises substantial questions about the direction and value of its investments.
In this case, FAS has determined, on the basis of an assessment of the market and its potential
effects in Angola, to focus on the hospitality sector. That effectively draws the state into the
business of subsidizing training for one economic sector—dependent on market forces it does not
control, and unable, in any nimble way, to respond to market changes. As a consequence, any
change in the direction of economic opportunity, for example away from hospitality to small
manufacturing of consumer goods, would produce a large crop of ill-trained workers whose
condition would be all the worse for a bad centrally planned economic decision. There is neither
reason nor justification for this movement of FAS, other than perhaps to provide a reassuring
appearance of action, or the echo of political habits of bygone eras. Yet, it might have been
better if the FAS had been turned toward investment in market enhancing investments
(infrastructure, improvements in the regulatory climate, anti-corruption efforts, and the like)
that might have made it easier for private investors to exploit market opportunities in Angola
more nimbly.
Indeed, even as it begins its operations, the FAS has also begun to be mired in accusations of
corruption. It has been reported that the FSA “is widely seen as a way of bolstering his son’s
patronage base, possibly in preparation for him to succeed to the presidency.”132 But beyond the
suggestion of nepotism was the allegation of misuse of FSA funds for personal benefit.
The son of Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos is again at the centre of
controversy following reports that the Angolan Sovereign Wealth Fund he effectively
controls has invested R3-billion in a “trophy” property in London’s Mayfair district . . . .
There has been much adverse comment on Dos Santos’ junior conflicted role in the wealth
fund. In addition, he has been criticized for presiding over a fund that answers only to the
president, not to Angola’s Parliament, which is constitutionally responsible for such
oversight.133
But the allegation of corruption extended beyond that, going as well to the appointment to
the FSA advisory board of a friend of the President of Angola with hiring of an investment
manager with a questionable past.134 These produced a weak set of responses from the IMF.
They suggested that FSA reporting be sent periodically to the legislature (and not just the
president),135 and that the FSA would not serve well as a facility for macroeconomic
stabilization, a suggestion, perhaps, that the FSA was not living up to expectation.136
129Id.
130Social Charter, FUNDO SOBERANO DE ANGOLA, http://www.fundosoberano.ao/social-charter/.
131“As a part of this commitment, the Fund dedicates 7.5 percent of its endowment to social development and
socially responsible projects in the areas of education, income generation and off-the-grid access to clean water,
healthcare and energy.” Id.
132Aristides Cabeche, Angola: President’s son dips into sovereign fund for ‘trophy’ Savile Row office, MAIL AND
GUARDIAN (Nov. 15, 2013, 00:00) http://mg.co.za/article/2013-11-14-presidents-son-dips-into-sovereign-fund-for-trophy-
savile-row-office; see also Angola names president’s son to chair $5 bln sovereign wealth fund, REUTERS (June 21,
2013, 9:43 AM) http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/21/angola-fund-idUSL5N0EX29020130621.
133Cabeche, supra note 132.
134Cabeche, supra note 132.
135
Staff is of the view that quarterly reports to the National Assembly (similar to the process of reporting
for budget execution) are necessary for preserving transparency, and the resources with which the
FSDEA will be funded have to be decided as part of the regular budgeting process to preserve the
principles of unity and universality of the budget.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 14/81 19 (2014), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/
2014/cr1481.pdf.
136
In this regard, the investment strategy announced in June 2013 confirmed that the FSDEA’s funds will
not be allocated towards assets which could provide liquidity in case of sudden balance of payments
or financial needs, so that the extent to which FSDEA will provide a stabilization role is unclear. Given
that the Oil for Infrastructure Fund (OIF) was envisioned as an important instrument for reducing the
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Effectively, the IMF suggested Angola start again.137 The Angolan experiment and its failure is
not unique.138
D. Mauritania National Fund for Hydrocarbon Reserves (Fonds Nacional des Revenus des
Hydrocarbures (FNRH)139
The FNRH was established in 2006 as both a stabilization fund and a fund to amass savings for
future generations. It falls, then, as do many smaller funds of developing states, into the category
of macroeconomic disciplinary technique to remove temptation from current governmental leaders.
As the name implies, it is funded from revenues received from royalties and other payments
connected with the extraction of hydrocarbons from Mauritania. It was recently reported that the
fund had deposited about $90 million (US) for the 2013 fiscal year,140 but had total assets in 2014
of about $113 million.141
Like other SWFs established in developing states, IFI technical assistance, and efforts to
internationalize standards through the development of institutionalized facilities to strengthen
government plays a significant role. This was apparent, for example, in the decision of Mauritania
to accede in 2005 to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), launched at the World
Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in September 2002. The application of these
principles of this initiative fosters transparency in the use of revenues from the mining and oil
industries.142 To operate the SWF, “government revenues from hydrocarbons are therefore
deposited into an open account held with a reputable banking establishment” and a National
Council on Extractive Industry Transparency (CNTIE) was established, “with a membership
comprising representatives of government agencies and civil society.”143
Footnote continued
impact of oil revenue volatility on the public investment program, in its absence this function will need
to be taken up by additional foreign exchange reserves and other foreign-currency Treasury deposits at
the BNA.
Id. at 18.
137“As currently designed, the FSDEA does not have a stabilization mandate, placing a greater burden on
international reserves. In this context, the authorities should consider reestablishing a dedicated stabilization
mechanism to reduce the fiscal impact of oil revenue volatility.” Id. at 22.
138It was recently noted:
Available information suggests that African SWFs have been subject to regular capital withdrawals to
balance governments’ budgets and repay external debt. For instance, the balance of Nigeria Excess
Crude Account (ECA) decreased from USD 20 billion in 2008 to less than USD 3 billion in 2010 while
Sudan almost wiped out its Oil Revenue Stabilization Fund (ORSF) (Medani, 2010). Similarly, Algeria
has been using its Fonds de Regularisation des Recettes (FRR) to repay public debt.
Thouraya Triki & Issa Faye, Africa’s Quest for Development: Can Sovereign Wealth Funds help? 9 (African
Development Bank, Working Paper No. 142, 2011) available at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/
Documents/Publications/WPS%20No%20142%20Africas%20Quest%20for%20Development%20%20Can%20Sovereign
%20Wealth%20Funds%20help%20AS.pdf.
139Discussed more fully in Larry Catá Backer, Part 4: Mauritania National Fund for Hydrocarbon Reserves–
Reimaging the State in the Global Sphere: An Inventory of Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulator and Participant in
Global Markets, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Feb. 5, 2014, 2:41 PM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/part-4-
mauritania-national-fund-for.html.
140Fonds national de revenus des hydrocarbures mauritaniens : Plus de 90 millions $ encaissés, NOORINFO, Jan. 21,
2014, http://www.noorinfo.com/notes/Fonds-national-de-revenus-des-hydrocarbures-mauritaniens-Plus-de-90-millions
–encaisses_b6250145.html.
141Mauritanie/Pétrole : 113 millions de dollars dans le fonds National de Revenus des Hydrocarbures (FNRH), POINTS
CHOUD.INFO, May 2, 2014, http://www.pointschauds.info/fr/2014/05/02/mauritaniepetrole-113-millions-de-dollars-dans-le-
fonds-national-de-revenus-des-hydrocarbures-fnrh/. Accounts vary, see, e.g., Mozambique plans sovereign wealth fund,
PM NEWS, May 29, 2014, http://www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2014/05/29/mozambique-plans-sovereign-wealth-fund/
($300 million but hard to gauge reliability).
142Islamic Republic of Mauritania: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, WORLD BANK RESOURCES 37 (June 7, 2011),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/Mauritania_PRSP%28June7-2011%29.pdf (last visited Oct. 7,
2014) (“Mauritania joined this initiative in a global context of government measures taken in recent years to institute
transparent regulations in the management of mining and hydrocarbons and to help those sectors better contribute
to securing economic growth, distributing the revenues, and reducing poverty, which still affects approximately 42
percent of Mauritanians. In so doing, the government authorities are seeking to forestall the missed opportunities
that other countries have experienced in making effective use of their natural resources.”).
143Id. The CNTIE was charged with preparing public reports, hiring an outside reviewer, drafting action plans, and
ensuring civil society participation “actively throughout the entire process and that it contributes to the public
debate.” Id.
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The ability of Mauritania to adhere to the disciplinary structures of its SWF may have already
been tested. Mauritania has had recourse to its SWF for short-term needs; “Mauritania withdrew
USD 45 million from its Fonds National des Revenus des Hydrocarbures leaving a balance of USD
34.25 million as of March 2009.”144 But as noted above, the SWF has recovered some of its
assets. However, it remains small. It is a small fund. It was reported that “the national oil revenue
fund (FNRH) is credited with more than US$ 55 million. The fund, managed by the central bank of
Mauritania (BCM), keeps all revenue from the oil sector activities – exploration, development and
exploitation.”145 The viability and relevance of the SWF may be tested as the price of petroleum
declines significantly, as it did in 2014. The resulting decline in revenues will make it more difficult
for the FNRH to play a significant role in national macro-economic policy, whether directed
inbound or outbound.146
Mauritania is neither a signatory of the Santiago Principles nor does its transparency rating
appear high (Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index of 1).147 It is not a member of the International
Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. It is not clear whether this fund will succeed in its objectives.
It is not clear how its investments are directed; it does not appear that the Mauritanian state plans
to use this as anything other than a rainy day fund, at least for the short term. Much more work is
necessary to get a better sense of the operation of this SWF in an environment in which, in 2013,
the World Bank noted a weak rule of law environment generally.148 Here again, the SWF has
appeared more useful in theory than in fact, though it remains an IFI instrument in the absence of
any other. And in the absence of transparency, and without any marker of a willingness to do
much other than accede to what it seems its lenders might want, there is little to suggest that
Mauritania may make much use of its fund. This is particularly true given Mauritania’s record on
slavery, abolished officially only in 1981 (though the government does maintain that the practice
as defined by it does not exist).149
E. Venezuela Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund (Fondo para la Estabilización Económics
(FEM) and the National Development Fund (Fonden)150
The Venezuela Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund (Fondo para la Estabilización Económics or FEM)
is one of the most opaque funds in Latin America. Its genesis and evolution are tied closely to the
substantial political transformations and economic shocks that have roiled Venezuela in the first
decades of the twenty-first century, and especially its move toward a fairly unique blend of
socialist regionalism centered on Cuban-Venezuelan relations.151 Venezuela’s funds represent the
144Triki & Faye, supra note 138, at 9.
145Id.
146It was noted in mid 2014 that:
Oil production from Mauritania’s offshore field of Chinguetti brought in US$ 1.3 million to the public
treasury in July 2014, official sources told PANA Wenesday. The receipts, however, sharply dropped
compared to US$ 12 million revenue recorded in June. Chinguetti is presently the only operating oil
field in Mauritania.
Mauritania: Oil revenue drops to US$1.3 million in July 2014, PANAPRESS, Aug. 20, 2014, http://www.panapress.com/
Mauritania–Oil-revenue-drops-to-US$1.3-million-in-July-2014–3-925564-0-lang2-index.html.
147Triki & Faye, supra note 138, at 11.
148See Islamic Republic of Mauritania: Financial Sector Development Strategy and Action Plan 2013–2017, WORLD
BANK RESOURCES { 132 (2013), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/07/10/
000333037_20130710104935/Rendered/PDF/793310ESW0MR0P00PUBLIC00Box0377373B.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2014)
(“Accordingly, the law of contract, commercial law, the civil procedure and investment law have been completely
reviewed over the past ten years. However, the regulatory texts required for implementing these laws have not all
been adopted, the institutions created have not been financed, the new texts have not been disseminated and
popularized, and magistrates have been trained only very recently. The new texts are not respected by the players
themselves, and the sanctions stipulated by the texts are not applied.”).
149See, e.g., John D. Sutter, Slavery’s Last Stronghold, CNN, Mar. 2012, http://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2012/03/
world/mauritania.slaverys.last.stronghold/index.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2014). Slavery was not criminalized in
Mauritania until 2007. See id.
150Discussed further in Larry Catá Backer, Part 19 Venezuela SWFs (Stabilization (FEM) and Development
(Fonden))–Reimaging the State in the Global Sphere: An Inventory of Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulator and
Participant in Global Markets, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Mar. 3, 2014, 12:08 PM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/
2014/03/part-19-venezuela-fem-macroeconomic.html.
151See Larry Catá Backer & Augusto Molina, Cuba and the Construction of Alternative Global Trade Systems: ALBA
and Free Trade in the Americas, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 679 (2010).
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two extremes of modern SWF instrumentalization—one grounded in IFI globalization and the other
on Cuban Marxist-Leninist principles.
The FEM was established as a tool of International Monetary Fund financial reforms for
Venezuela, similar to those that resulted in the establishment of the Angolan SWF in 2012.
“In 1998 the ‘Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund,’ also known as FEM was established as a result
of advice from the IMF . . . FEM . . . is a fund created by the authority of the Presidency of the
Republic. The regulation of the fund by the Board of the Central Bank of Venezuela - BCV began
in December of 1999. The fund serves to hedge the fluctuation of income generated by crude
oil.”152 The FEM has been inward looking. It is governed by the board of the Central Bank of
Venezuela. The President of the Republic has a substantial role in the governance of the FEM but
the legislature does not. FEM does not have a substantial autonomy from the government, nor are
its funds well protected from use by government as it needs them for short term projects or to
make up budgetary shortfalls.
Its role as a stabilization fund, however, was substantially transformed during the first decade of
the twenty-first century, when it was redirected to the objective of contributing toward national
development goals in line with the socialist character of Chavez’s administration. In 2003, the
original objectives of the FEM were attempted to be reformed by the Parliament, though these
efforts were unsuccessful.153 By 2005, however, change came when it was determined to set
the annual contribution to the FEM of about 20 percent of petroleum net revenues. But this
contribution level was abandoned in 2006 and the government of Hugo Chavez attempted to
eliminate the FEM via constitutional change, but that was rejected by voters in 2007 and never
achieved.154 Instead of abandonment, the FEM has been used increasingly as a development fund
under the discretion of the President.155 Thus, the FEM in recent years has both suffered
substantial depletion, and also a substantial change in its objectives as a rainy day and
development fund.
“Where does Venezuela go from here? . . . . We tried to get an assessment of Venezuela’s total
national wealth including its sovereign wealth fund Fonden (the National Development Fund), but
the accounting is very opaque; the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute gives Venezuela its lowest
transparency score, along with Libya, Algeria and Mauritania.”156 But these are political choices
(development versus stabilization; wealth protection versus institution for the management of its
expenditure, etc.) with which outsiders need not quibble, but which have effects on the use and
viability of the FEM for purposes other than as a conduit for national spending. At its extreme, it
suggests that the Venezuelan funds have been transformed from SWF classic funds to
something else–more akin to the Palestine fund,157 as a conduit for internal development
152
It receives revenues above a reference price, currently $9 per barrel, that is based on the average oil
price of the last five years. Oil revenues above the reference price are transferred to the fund. If oil
prices drop below the reference price, the fund transfers revenues to the treasury to substitute the
revenues it would otherwise have received if oil prices had been stable.
Venezuela, SWF INVESTIGUIDE, https://www.swfinvestguide.com/Venezuela.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2014).
153Gobierno venezolano utiliza últimos recursos del FEM, AMÉRICA ECONÓMICA, Nov. 1, 2011, http://www.ameri
caeconomia.com/economia-mercados/gobierno-venezolano-utiliza-ultimos-recursos-del-fem.
154Id.
155President Hugo Chavez requested US$ 500 million from the FEM accounts in order to finance projects that will
respond to the emergency caused by the rains and specifically for housing construction. Gobierno venezolano utiliza
últimos recursos del FEM, supra note 153.
156Michael Cembalest, What’s Next for Venezuela, ZEROHEDGE.COM (Mar. 8, 2013, 20:53) http://www.zerohedge.com/
news/2013-03-08/whats-next-venezuela (“Despite all the challenges, Venezuela’s economic model may well survive
given how high oil prices are. The budget deficit and growth in domestic debt in Bolivars is explosively high, but so
is inflation . . . ”).
157Discussed in Larry Catá Backer, Part 10: Palestine Investment Fund–Reimaging the State in the Global Sphere:
An Inventory of Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulator and Participant in Global Markets, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY
(Feb. 14, 2014, 11:58 AM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/part-10-palestine-investment-fund.html. In the
case of Palestine, it is the European Union rather then IFIs that are the principle sponsors and socialization agents of
the fund.
In a sense, then, the PIF begins to acquire the character more as a vehicle for the disbursement of
foreign aid than as a means of channeling sovereign wealth. The context may make this inevitable in
this time in Palestinian history. But in a sense, the PIF is most interesting for the possibilities it offers
as a means of serving as a “reverse” SWF.
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based on political goals, than as an investment vehicle for the outward projection through
private markets of internal wealth.
Yet, Venezuela also has a development fund. The FEM is one of two funds maintained by
Venezuela. The other is a National Development Fund. But these have been utilized
interchangeably under the presidency of Hugo Chavez and his successors.
Fonden is the largest of a handful of secretive funds that put decisions on how to spend
tens of billions of dollars in the hands of Chavez, who has vowed to turn the OPEC
nation’s economy into a model of oil-financed socialism. Since its founding seven years
ago, Fonden has been funneling cash into hundreds of projects personally approved by
Chavez but not reviewed by Congress – from swimming-pool renovations for soldiers, to
purchases of Russian fighter jets, to public housing and other projects with broad popular
appeal.158
The Venezuelan state paints Fonden differently, as a successful facility for wealth transfer and
development within Venezuela. “FONDEN’s resources are in bolivares and foreign currency and it is
at the service of the Executive for what the Bolivarian Government decides to.”159
Two principal points are relevant here. The first is that the NDF is meant to serve internal
investment administered by the Venezuelan government. The second, is that the NDF is neither
autonomous from the state nor are its operations transparent. This later point has raised issues of
accountability.
About two weeks ago, I told the story of Deputy Carlos Ramos of the National Assembly
who provided us with an Excel spreadsheet of the projects financed by Fonden – the
“development” fund that President Hugo Chávez created and uses as his sort of petty cash
fund for immediate needs – after I wrote to him.160
This does not make it unique but it does suggest that the fund will have limited reach in private
global markets except perhaps indirectly. Yet, this is consonant with the moves to embrace a state
to state ideology of trade that is reflected in the construction of the ALBA (Alianza Bolivariana
para los Pueblos de Nuestra América) regional trade association.
And indeed, even as the Venezuelan state has starved FEM, it has continued to fund NDF for local
development (abandoning in effect the stabilization function of the FEM–which is viewed ideologically
as contrary to the socialist ideology of the current government). “Despite a fitful US dollar flow, the
Venezuelan government has instructed both the Central Bank of Venezuelan [sic] (BCV) and oil giant
Pdvsa to transfer USD 11.7 billion to the National Development Fund (Fonden) this year.”161
This suggests that Venezuela has also joined the growing number of states that have functionally
differentiated their SWFs among stabilization, development, investment and other functions, but also
that in Venezuela’s case, these funds appear to be operated more as facilities for budgeting than
as investment vehicles. For purists, the question then becomes, is this a SWF? And if so what does
that tell us about the evolution of the concept, or has it become so broad that it ceases to have
meaning? For those interested in the use of SWFs as an instrument of global socialization and
governance building along global consensus lines, it suggests the scope and nature of outlier funds.
Footnote continued
Id. And this characteristic focuses very precisely on the important role of SWFs not as a means of fiscal policy but as
a facility for overcoming the limits of weak governance institutions in recipient states.
158
The fund now accounts for nearly a third of all investment in Venezuela and half of public investment,
and last year received 25 percent of government revenue from the oil industry. All told, it has taken in
close to $100 billion of Venezuela’s oil revenue in the past seven years.
Brian Ellsworth & Eyanir Chinea, Special Report: Chavez’s oil-fed fund obscures Venezuela money trail, REUTERS
(Sept. 26, 2012, 7:16 AM) http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/26/us-venezuela-chavez-fund-i
dUSBRE88P0N020120926.
159Venezuelan National Development Fund has invested over $100 billion since 2005, THE EMBASSY OF THE BOLIVARIAN
REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA IN THE UK AND IRELAND, http://embavenez.co.uk/?q¼content/venezuelan-national-development-fund-
has-invested-over-100-billion-2005 (last visited Oct. 9, 2014).
160Miguel Octavio, Is $29 billion missing from Hugo Chavez’s Fonden development fund?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
Aug. 30, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2011/0830/Is-29-billion-missing-from
-Hugo-Chavez-s-Fonden-development-fund.
161Mayela Armas H., Central Bank of Venezuela to transfer USD 3.7 billion to Fonden, EL UNIVERSAL (Jan. 24, 2014,
11:21 AM), http://www.eluniversal.com/economia/140114/central-bank-of-venezuela-to-transfer-usd-37-billion-to-fonden
(“The move may have an impact on Venezuela’s international reserves, currently at USD 20.8 billion, a level that is
not sufficient to meet the country’s economic needs.”).
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F. Sovereign Wealth Fund of Gabon162
The Sovereign Wealth Fund of Gabon (Fonds Souverain de la Republique Gabonaise or FSRG) is
another of the recently created African SWFs. Its purpose, like that of other African SWFs,
represents an emerging pattern of fiscal discipline for developing states. They all serve to detach
and perhaps make more difficult, the ability of a state to dip into its wealth for current spending
except as permitted under the framework established for the operation of this “special” account.
The SWFs (stabilization and development oriented) were meant to resolve Gabon’s traditional
“trouble with insufficient fiscal management, overinflated public sector operating costs, and
payment delays on public building projects.”163
Thus, the purpose of these SWFs may well be to increase or preserve national wealth, but the
principal objective was directed inward rather than outward as a means of leveraging private
power for public aims beyond national borders. And, indeed, it is sometimes understood as a
means of constraining corruption.
It is my considered argument that in nations such as Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Congo
[Kinshasha] Gabon, Angola among others whereby natural resources endowed to those
entities are explored and the revenue accruable from the export of those rare resources
stolen by successive political administrations and diverted to private pockets, it would be
imperative for such countries to consider establishing Sovereign Wealth Funds and for
strong institutional and legal frameworks to be enforced for the national assets saved in
form of sovereign wealth funds used to build functional infrastructure to promote better
life for the greatest number of the citizenry.164
As in other cases, Gabon presents an instance where IFIs suggest deployment of the forms of the
SWF as a toolkit for fiscal discipline in developing states.165 But this approach has been subject to
criticism. “[C]ritics say Africa could reap more from its resources by investing in education, energy,
and transport to feed other industries, rather than parking the money in liquid but low-yield assets
in safe havens, as sovereign funds tend to do.”166
In any case, Gabonese policy determined that the establishment of a SWF was in its interests as a
means of managing its oil related revenues. “Gabon’s fund will be called the Fonds Souverain de la
Republique and is targeted to raise e760 million. Once 25% of this target is reached, investment
returns and surplus oil revenues will be used to hit the target.”167 But the story of FSRG is not one of
creation out of whole cloth. Gabon began to use precursors to its SWF in 1998 with the creation of a
“future generations” fund as a special account at the Bank of Central African States (BEAC), which it
converted to a SWF in 2010, with “10 million and the understanding that it was to be controlled by
the Gabonese President as he liked.”168 The development side of the SWF project was commenced in
2011 with the establishment of a stimulus fund as a disciplinary tool for the management of
development projects in line with an “Emerging Gabon” economic agenda.169
162Discussed further in Larry Catá Backer, Part 21 Sovereign Wealth Fund of Gabon (Fonds Souverain de la
Republique Gabonaise)–Reimaging the State in the Global Sphere: An Inventory of Sovereign Wealth Funds as
Regulator and Participant in Global Markets, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Mar. 9, 2014, 10:40 PM), http://lcbackerblog.
blogspot.com/2014/03/part-21-sovereign-wealth-fund-of-gabon.html.
163Gabon: Partnered for growth, LE GABON.ORG, Aug. 15, 2012, http://www.en.legabon.org/news/657/gabon-partnered-
growth.
164Emmanuel Onwubiko, Is Sovereign Wealth Fund a Right?, THE NIGERIAN VOICE (Jan. 14, 2013, 22:42),
http://www.thenigerianvoice.com/nvnews/105496/1/is-sovereign-wealth-fund-a-right.html.
165Das, Lu, Mulder & Sy, supra note 3.
166African Countries Race To Build Sovereign Wealth Funds, supra note 61.
167Gabon Creates Latest Oil-Fueled SWF, CHIEF INVESTMENT OFFICER, Feb. 7, 2012, http://ai-cio.com/channel/
NEWSMAKERS/Gabon_Creates_Latest_Oil-Fueled_SWF.html. See also ROMUALD YONGA, GUIDES DE FONDS SOUVERAINS AFRICAINS
(2012), available at http://www.african-markets.com/pdf/fr/Guide_des_Fonds_Souverains_Africains_FR.pdf.
168U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS, REPORT–2012 INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT - GABON
(2012), available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2012/191151.htm.
In an effort to better utilise income for economic growth, the government remodelled the Fund for
Future Generations and launched a new sovereign wealth fund (SWF) in February, which will
henceforth be managed exclusively by the newly created Strategic Investment Fund (FGIS). The FGIS
will also be responsible for managing all of the government’s stakes.
Gabon: Partnered for growth, supra note 163.
169U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 168.
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Despite the evolution, the governance features of the now multiple funds remain troubling from a
rule of law perspective, though in a way that mimics Venezuela’s current approach. The FSRG is
placed under the direct control of the President of the Republic.170 The investment objectives of the
FSRG is to diversify economic development in Gabon, rather than to project Gabonese wealth outside
the state through investments in foreign state markets. It is managed by the BEAC. The principle
objective of the SWF is to make money.171 However, it appears that the Gabonese President has
broadened the investment scope of the FSRG to include some strategic investments abroad in clearly
identified strategic industries.172 This affects the disciplinary potential of the FSRG, something noted
by the IMF in a recent review of Gabon’s petroleum fund management.173 Indeed, for the IMF, the
critical issue for Gabon is the balance between its stabilization and development objectives.174
G. Palestine Investment Fund175
The Palestine Investment Fund (PIF)176 is a small strategic development sovereign wealth fund
created through the transfer of assets managed by the Palestinian National Authority to an
administrative apparatus set up for that purpose. It has also been described as a “private equity and
venture capital firm specializing in investments in start-ups, early stage, growth capital, spin-off, and
capital raising or business development investments.”177 PIF suggests the way that the form of use of
SWFs may be evolving, and may well test the limits of the use of the device as a disciplinary tool.
The PIF is organized as a limited public company, with a juridical personality autonomous of the
state apparatus in Palestine. It is overseen by a board of directors charged with the management
of investment portfolios and enterprises that are involved in development projects, and a general
assembly with about thirty members.178 Thus, PIF’s operations may be conducted either directly or
through operating subsidiaries or investment partners.179 The political apparatus is involved in the
selection and removal of the PIF’s leadership.180 The size of the PIF Board may be modified by
170Frédéric Maury, Gabon : le fonds souverain doté de 500 milliards de francs CFA, JEUNE AFRIQUE, Feb. 6, 2012,
http://economie.jeuneafrique.com/regions/afrique-subsaharienne/7590-gabon-le-fonds-souverain-dote-de-500-milliards
-de-f-cfa.html (“Il est placé sous l’autorité du président de la République Ali Bongo Odimba.”).
171
In other words, the mission of Serge Mickoto the head of FGIS is to return a profit through the
strategic investment of resources that the Gabonese government transfers annually to FSRG and which
comes mainly from oil revenues (about 10%). Suffice it to say that the former CFO of BGFIBank first
banking group in Central Africa, is one of the key people in the strategy of diversification of the
Gabonese economy initiated by President Ali Bongo Ondimba (ABO).
Stéphane Ballong, Gabon : Serge Mickoto prépare l’après-pétrole, JEUNE AFRIQUE, April 23, 2012.
172
To achieve this objective, FSRG has invested both in Gabon and abroad in companies in the
infrastructure, mining, port management and other key areas identified by the policies of President Ali
Bongo. In this respect, the FGIS was one of the sources used for government involvement in public-
private partnership (PPP) with the Singapore Aman Resorts, for an investment of at least $ 70 million
over five years.
Biggie Malouana, Le Fonds gabonais d’investissements stratégiques s’adjuge 8% d’Oragroup, GABON REVIEW, Oct. 8,
2013 (the FSRG also took an 8 percent interest in Oragroup a pan-African banking group).
173“Oil revenue management has been strengthened with the revision of the legal framework for the sovereign
wealth fund, to make it more consistent with Santiago Principles. Transparency in the oil revenue management was
improved with the publication of annual EITI reports for the years 2007 to 2010.” INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, IMF
COUNTRY REPORT NO. 13/55 { 2 (2013), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr1355.pdf
(statement by Mr. Assimaidou on Gabon).
174Id. at 37. Development initiatives are also effectuated in concert with the World Bank. See id. at 6.
175Discussed further in Part 10: Palestine Investment Fund–Reimaging the State in the Global Sphere: An Inventory
of Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulator and Participant in Global Markets, supra note 157.
176The PIF website may be accessed at http://www.pif.ps/index.php?lang¼en.
177Company Overview of Palestine Investment Fund PLC, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS WEEK http://investing.businessweek.com/
research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId¼62147909 (last updated Feb. 14, 2014).
178Omar Shaban, Palestinian Investment Fund Needs Reform, AL-MONITOR, May 14, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/
pulse/originals/2013/05/palestinian-investment-fund-reform.html#ixzz2tJXdTTYv.
179See About PIF, PALESTINE INVESTMENT FUND, http://www.pif.ps/index.php?lang¼en&page ¼ 124402202521
(last visited Sept. 27, 2014).
180Currently Dr. Mohammad Mustafa is the Chairman of the PIF and joined the PIF in 2005. Members of the Board
serve three year terms and are appointed by the President. “Mr. Mustafa is said to be a trusted aide to Mr. Abbas,
and replaced Salam Fayyad in mid 2013 in this role.” Roger Cohen, Fayyad Steps Down, Not Out, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/04/opinion/global/Roger-Cohen-Fayyad-Steps-Down-Not-Out.html?
pagewanted¼all.
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presidential decree,181 and the general assembly is supposed to include stakeholders from critical
actors in Palestinian political and economic society.182 PIF, then, is meant to operate the business
of Palestinian development as devolved to it, but in a way that is insulated from the political
apparatus and subject to conventional business and financial standards. It represents an effort
to adopt the forms of private management to a public enterprise.
PIF originated in 2000 and became operational in 2003. But it continues to be subject to
modification of its internal order and investment-operational objectives.183 As of December 31,
2012, PIF controlled roughly $800 million for its activities.184 Those holdings might have been
reduced thereafter by about $200 million as the PIF sought greater transparency and monitoring of
its internal accounting.185 Both PIF’s mission186 and vision187 are complicated by the issues relating
to the Palestinian-Israeli Wars and the shifting objectives of the parties.188
As a vehicle for development as well as governance discipline, the focus of PIF’s activities are
investment within Palestine.189 The object is to provide, through PIF, a structure through which
money received can be devoted to a core set of development missions. “In 2012, PIF started
implementing its three year corporate social plan which focuses on supporting specific initiatives
and programs with clear developmental impact and potential for sustainability. Programs to
develop the Palestinian youth and to prepare them for the job market are in the core of PIF CSR
strategy.”190 That has translated into investments that focus on telecommunications, power,
tourism, real-estate and hospitality, trade and industry, energy, manufacturing, services,
infrastructure sector, capital markets sector, and financial services.191 One of the most interesting
projects of PIF involves investment in areas of Palestinian settlement within the region.192
It comes as no surprise that a SWF like PIF, established as a disciplinary tool insulated from the
emerging political and governance constraints of the political sector, would be most susceptible to
monitoring in those areas. Thus, for example, the independence and functioning of PIF has been
subject to some controversy, especially within the United States, as a donor nation.193 While a bit
181Board of Directors, PALESTINE INVESTMENT FUND, http://www.pif.ps/index.php?lang¼en&page ¼ 124402287954
(last visited Sept. 27, 2014). See also Annual Report 2012, PALESTINE INVESTMENT FUND 12–13 http://www.pif.ps/resources/
file/annual_report/EnglishAnnualReport.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2014).
182Annual Report 2012, supra note 181, at 10, 14–15.
183PIF reported on its website, for example, that “At present, PIF is well-prepared to maximize the assets’ value for
its shareholders. Toward this end, PIF is intensifying its efforts to support the transformation of promising investment
portfolios in order to restructure itself as a dynamic organization with high institutional standards.” Palestine
Investment Promotion Agency, THE PALESTINE INVESTMENT FUND, http://www.pipa.gov.ps/pif.asp (last visited Sept. 27, 2014).
184See Annual Report 2012, supra note 181, at 50.
185See Maher Abukhater, Palestinian Authority Reveals $600 Million Investments, Democracy Council 2013 available
http://www.democracycouncil.org/media-events/press/600.html (“Revealing the results of a 345-page report prepared
by the Los Angeles, California-based Standard & Poor’s (S&P) consultants and the Democracy Council, Fayyad
stressed that publication of the report “is a major step forward” on the road toward full financial reforms.” Id). David
Bogoslaw, Icahn’s new megaphone for shareholder activism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2013, http://www.corporatesecretary.
com/articles/proxy-voting-shareholder-actions/12567/icahns-new-megaphone-shareholder-activism/.
186“PIF’s mission is to promote a strong, sustainable and independent Palestinian economy, that will be a cornerstone
of the independent Palestinian State with Jerusalem as its capital.” Annual Report 2012, supra note 181, at 9.
187PIFs’ vision is to promote sustainable growth in Palestine through in-country investment. Annual Report 2012,
supra note 181.
188Annual Report 2012, supra note 181, at 10 (“Palestine has been experiencing serious financial and economic
challenges, predominantly caused by Israeli occupation that has been and remains to be the single largest obstacle
inhibiting sustained economic growth, and forcing its reliance on foreign aid.”).
189
The firm prefers to invest in Palestine region with a focus on Jerusalem, Jordan Valley, and Dead Sea.
It also manages portfolio for its clients. The firm invests in the public equity and fixed income across
the globe. It can take both direct majority and minority stakes in its portfolio companies.
Company Overview of Palestine Investment Fund PLC, supra note 177.
190Corporate Social Responsibility, PALESTINE INVESTMENT FUND, http://www.pif.ps/index.php?lang¼en&
page¼124412111424 (last visited Sept. 27, 2014). An interactive map of its current investments may be accessed at
http://www.pif.ps/map.php?lang¼en.
191Company Overview of Palestine Investment Fund PLC, supra note 177.
192Annual Report 2012, supra note 181, at 46 (empowerment program, which aims to benefit Palestinian refugees
in Lebanon. The program endeavors to improve the standard of living of Palestinian refugees by improving their
economic and social conditions and by decreasing unemployment rates).
193See, e.g., Rick Richman, Who Owns the Palestine Investment Fund?, COMMENTARY MAGAZINE (Sept. 15, 2011), http://
www.commentarymagazine.com/2011/09/15/palestine-investment-fund-congress/ (noting corruption, cronyism and
questionable transactions).
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of the testimony might be read with some suspicion as posturing before the US Congress
strategically driven within the context of the Palestinian-Israeli Wars and the renewed pressures for
negotiation of settlement originating in the United States, the issue of corruption and of the
autonomy of the PIF remains one that will likely trouble it in the future. More concrete proposals
for reform have been made as well—including structural, monitoring, conflict of interest, and
autonomy reforms that are meant to strengthen the ability of the PIF to function as an effective
disciplinary unit within the Palestinian framework.194
The connection with its sponsors is to some extent singular and important for the operational
viability of PIF, one which is complicated by the unsettled nature of its relationship with Israel.195
This reliance on donors and sponsors196 is one which makes it much more sensitive to the views
and expectations of those outside institutions that fund PIF. Indeed, PIF must be careful to
maintain close relationships with sponsors, usually abroad. In a sense, this suggests an inversion
of the usual arrangement of relationships between SWF home and host states. The World Bank
plays a critical role as a coordinator and sponsor of funds inflow.197 This is supplemented
by public and private sponsors in Europe, where PIF periodically engages in road shows
for sponsors.198
In a sense, then, the PIF begins to acquire the character more as a vehicle for the disbursement
of foreign aid than as a means of channeling sovereign wealth. The context may make this
inevitable in this time in Palestinian history. But, in another sense, the PIF is most interesting for
the possibilities it offers as a means of serving as a “reverse” SWF. If the PIF is able to build string
institutional structures, it might then well serve the state of Palestine as it seeks to arrange its
economy and find a means of both internal development and avoid the corruption that sometimes
attends to the inbound flow of aid funds.
IV. CONCLUSION
Considering Sovereign Development Funds as a SWF subset, Ashby Monk was right to suggest that
with these funds “there’s a remarkable opportunity—in fact it’s a requirement—to re-root
investment organizations in the “real”, and to take a limited pool of capital and create wealth in
general terms . . . . Their extra-financial mandates are, in a way, a license to think outside the box
and to take on big problems.”199 I have suggested that:
194Described in Shaban, supra note 178.
195
Donor funded flows had increased government-funded services but that growth model was
unsustainable . . . . Large-scale foreign investments being invited will require significant relaxation of
restrictions by Israel, which remain the major impediment to sustainable economic growth . . . . The
Palestinian Authority also has a significant responsibility to maintain its substantial achievements on
institution building. It will need to stay the course on reforms that are within its control– to strengthen
its fiscal position and deliver essential public services–even while transitions are ongoing within.
INGER ANDERSEN, VICE PRESIDENT FOR MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, THE WORLD BANK (2013), available at http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/WESTBANKGAZAEXTN/Resources/AHLCSeptember2013StatementbytheWorldBank.pdf.
196The World Bank published a donor list for 2012. See WEST BANK AND GAZA COUNTRY MANAGEMENT UNIT MIDDLE EAST AND
NORTH AFRICA REGION, THE WORLD BANK, INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
ASSOCIATION AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION INTERIM STRATEGY, NOTE FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA 2012–2014 35 (2012),
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/IS0412.pdf.
197See id. at {{ 22–24. This included work on government building efforts generally. “Support for the PA’s public
financial management, civil service reform and anti-corruption initiatives were the main areas of focus at the apex
level.” Id. at 26.
198
The Road Show is part of a strategic drive to increase exports of the Palestinian services sector by
promoting potential investment opportunities in the Palestinian economy and portraying success
stories of listed companies. It also aims at attracting institutional investors to stocks listed on the
Palestine Exchange (PEX), building long term relationships with UK companies, and demonstrating the
promising trading environment that Palestine represents.
Senior Delegation To Visit London To Promote Palestine Investment Opportunity - National Export Body (PalTrade)
And Palestine Stock Exchange To Lead Mission, MONDOVISIONE, Dec. 23, 2013, http://www.mondovisione.com/media-
and-resources/news/senior-delegation-to-visit-london-to-promote-palestine-investment-opportunity/.
199Ashby Monk, The Financial Value of Extra-Financial Motives, Avenue of Giants, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (Nov. 24, 2014:
12:00 PM), http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/blogarticle/3402495/blog/the-financial-value-of-extra-financial-
motives.html#.VG_ZHifJ7VQ.
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There is a need now to reframe our thinking. If nothing else, the imperatives of the
emerging realities of accepted behaviors now requires a focus on strategies that are firstly
coherent with the ideology of globalization (free movements of goods, capital, and
services, through non-state ordered private markets, based on open textured, borderless,
states); and that secondly can leverage the structures of globalization (creating structures
to tale advantage of opportunities coherent with porous border markets systems by states
and private actors).200
These insights acquire greater power as SWF investment strategies become increasingly connected
to IFI lending and macroeconomic policies.
This article examined the way in which changes in the objectives of SWFs have begun to affect
their operation and their character as part of the toolkit for macro-finance. It suggested the
growing importance of development (and stabilization to some extent), of internal finance policy
utility, of these funds. It has also suggested that at least in some developing states, SWFs may be
increasingly viewed as important for incubating governance behaviors as it serves the economic
policy of states. Both of these objectives have been utilized by IFIs in their lending and technical
assistance capacities as they have sought to socialize states into international norms and
expectations. A review of some recent efforts to establish SWFs with a stabilization or
development focus suggests the way in which these funds now may better serve the project of
fiscal and governance internationalization, and the development of global policy coherence
around the fiscal ideologies of IFIs, rather than as an instrument of national policy.
Part II considered the IFI’s interest in and approach to SWFs as a part of their investment,
capacity building and rule of law toolkits. The focus was around the argument that SWFs are
governance tools deployed to discipline developing countries in line with the Washington
Consensus/IFI ideology. Within the structures of that ideology, SWFs could serve as important
instruments for institutional discipline in states where there is reason to build a measure of
distance between the organs of state, and institutions driving fiscal policy. Its origins in
Washington Consensus premises are clear. Part III then reviewed the manifestation of this
approach in the development of SWFs in a number of developing states. Starting from a template
SWF, it looked at a number of recently established SWFs in Africa, tied to resource wealth
management, and also the somewhat unique case of a SWF that serves as a conduit for inbound
aid. This examination suggested the ways that stabilization and development SWFs might better
serve financial globalization than the particular interest of states establishing them precisely by
transposing global standards of fiscal and governance behavior into the internal workings of
states. Consequently, development and stabilization SWFs might be understood to serve as an
instrument of globalization from the top down (through IFI policy operationalization) perhaps
as effectively as SWFs that seek to project national financial power through private market
investments abroad. But, it also creates the possibility of divergence in the fundamental character
of SWFs that follows when SWFs are used as governance devices. In this disciplinary role, its utility
as an instrument of macro economic policy may be impaired.
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